Deps.rs

yubihsm 0.41.0

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/crate/yubihsm/0.41.0/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/crate/yubihsm/0.41.0)

This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate yubihsm

Dependencies

(27 total, 19 outdated, 1 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 aes^0.80.9.3out of date
 bitflags^12.13.2out of date
 cbc^0.10.2.1out of date
 ccm^0.50.6.1out of date
 cmac^0.70.8.0out of date
 digest^0.100.11.3out of date
 ecdsa^0.140.17.0out of date
 ed25519^1.33.0.0out of date
 ed25519-dalek ⚠️^13.0.0insecure
 hmac^0.120.13.0out of date
 k256^0.110.14.0out of date
 log^0.40.4.34up to date
 p256^0.110.14.0out of date
 p384^0.110.14.0out of date
 pbkdf2^0.110.13.0out of date
 rand_core^0.60.10.1out of date
 rusb^0.90.9.4up to date
 serde^11.0.229up to date
 serde_json^11.0.151up to date
 sha2^0.100.11.0out of date
 signature^1.3.23.0.0out of date
 subtle^22.6.1up to date
 thiserror^12.0.21out of date
 time^0.30.3.55up to date
 tiny_http^0.110.12.0out of date
 uuid^11.27.0up to date
 zeroize^11.9.0up to date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, 3 outdated, 2 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 ed25519-dalek ⚠️^13.0.0insecure
 once_cell^11.21.4up to date
 p256^0.110.14.0out of date
 rsa ⚠️^0.60.9.10insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

ed25519-dalek: Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on `ed25519-dalek`

RUSTSEC-2022-0093

Versions of ed25519-dalek prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.

Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S part of the signature, but not in the R value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same R and only differ on the S part.

Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.

Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled "hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.

rsa: Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels

RUSTSEC-2023-0071

Impact

Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.

Patches

No patch is yet available. The crypto-bigint migration (RustCrypto/RSA#394) did not close this. Tracking is RustCrypto/RSA#626 (padding still not constant-time). Implicit rejection work is in RustCrypto/RSA#680; default-path blinding is in RustCrypto/RSA#702.

Still affected as of 2026-09-12: rsa 0.9.10 (latest stable) and rsa 0.10.0-rc.18 (latest). patched = [] is intentional.

Workarounds

Avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers can observe timing, for example over the network. Local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.

References

This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.