This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate pgp

Dependencies

(46 total, 8 outdated, 1 insecure, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 aes^0.80.8.4up to date
 base64^0.21.00.22.1out of date
 bitfield^0.140.18.0out of date
 block-padding^0.3.20.3.3up to date
 blowfish^0.90.9.1up to date
 bstr^1.4.01.11.3up to date
 buffer-redux^1.0.01.0.2up to date
 byteorder^1.41.5.0up to date
 camellia^0.10.1.0up to date
 cast5^0.11.00.11.1up to date
 cfb-mode^0.8.10.8.2up to date
 chrono^0.4.230.4.39up to date
 cipher^0.40.4.4up to date
 crc24^0.10.1.6up to date
 curve25519-dalek ⚠️^4.0.0-rc.34.1.3maybe insecure
 derive_builder^0.12.00.20.2out of date
 des^0.80.8.1up to date
 digest^0.100.10.7up to date
 ed25519-dalek ⚠️^2.0.0-rc.32.1.1maybe insecure
 elliptic-curve^0.130.13.8up to date
 flate2^1.01.0.35up to date
 generic-array^0.141.2.0out of date
 getrandom^0.2.60.3.1out of date
 gperftools^0.2.00.2.0up to date
 hex^0.40.4.3up to date
 idea^0.50.5.1up to date
 log^0.4.60.4.25up to date
 md-5^0.10.50.10.6up to date
 nom^7.08.0.0out of date
 num-bigint-dig^0.8.10.8.4up to date
 num-derive^0.4.00.4.2up to date
 num-traits^0.2.60.2.19up to date
 p256^0.130.13.2up to date
 p384^0.130.13.0up to date
 rand^0.80.9.0out of date
 ripemd^0.1.30.1.3up to date
 rsa ⚠️^0.9.00.9.7insecure
 sha1^0.10.50.10.6up to date
 sha2^0.10.60.10.8up to date
 sha3^0.10.50.10.8up to date
 signature^2.0.02.2.0up to date
 smallvec^1.8.01.13.2up to date
 thiserror^1.0.302.0.11out of date
 twofish^0.70.7.1up to date
 x25519-dalek^2.0.0-rc.32.0.1up to date
 zeroize^1.51.8.1up to date

Dev dependencies

(9 total, 4 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 glob^0.30.3.2up to date
 hex-literal^0.30.4.1out of date
 pretty_assertions^11.4.1up to date
 pretty_env_logger^0.40.5.0out of date
 rand_chacha^0.30.9.0out of date
 rand_xorshift^0.30.4.0out of date
 regex^1.71.11.1up to date
 serde^1.01.0.217up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.138up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

ed25519-dalek: Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on `ed25519-dalek`

RUSTSEC-2022-0093

Versions of ed25519-dalek prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.

Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S part of the signature, but not in the R value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same R and only differ on the S part.

Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.

Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled "hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.

rsa: Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels

RUSTSEC-2023-0071

Impact

Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.

Patches

No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.

Workarounds

The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.

References

This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.

curve25519-dalek: Timing variability in `curve25519-dalek`'s `Scalar29::sub`/`Scalar52::sub`

RUSTSEC-2024-0344

Timing variability of any kind is problematic when working with potentially secret values such as elliptic curve scalars, and such issues can potentially leak private keys and other secrets. Such a problem was recently discovered in curve25519-dalek.

The Scalar29::sub (32-bit) and Scalar52::sub (64-bit) functions contained usage of a mask value inside a loop where LLVM saw an opportunity to insert a branch instruction (jns on x86) to conditionally bypass this code section when the mask value is set to zero as can be seen in godbolt:

A similar problem was recently discovered in the Kyber reference implementation:

https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/hqbtIGFKIpU/m/cnE3pbueBgAJ

As discussed on that thread, one portable solution, which is also used in this PR, is to introduce a volatile read as an optimization barrier, which prevents the compiler from optimizing it away.

The fix can be validated in godbolt here:

The problem was discovered and the solution independently verified by Alexander Wagner [email protected] and Lea Themint [email protected] using their DATA tool:

https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/DATA