Deps.rs

libp2p-core 0.30.2

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/crate/libp2p-core/0.30.2/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/crate/libp2p-core/0.30.2)

This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate libp2p-core

Dependencies

(26 total, 11 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 asn1_der^0.7.40.7.6up to date
 bs58^0.4.00.5.1out of date
 ed25519-dalek ⚠️^1.0.12.1.1out of date
 either^1.51.13.0up to date
 fnv^1.01.0.7up to date
 futures^0.3.10.3.31up to date
 futures-timer^33.0.3up to date
 instant^0.1.110.1.13up to date
 lazy_static^1.21.5.0up to date
 libsecp256k1^0.7.00.7.1up to date
 log^0.40.4.22up to date
 multiaddr^0.13.00.18.2out of date
 multihash^0.140.19.2out of date
 multistream-select^0.100.13.0out of date
 parking_lot^0.11.00.12.3out of date
 pin-project^1.0.01.1.7up to date
 prost^0.90.13.3out of date
 rand^0.80.8.5up to date
 ring^0.16.90.17.8out of date
 rw-stream-sink^0.2.00.4.0out of date
 sha2^0.9.10.10.8out of date
 smallvec^1.6.11.13.2up to date
 thiserror^1.01.0.68up to date
 unsigned-varint^0.70.8.0out of date
 void^11.0.2up to date
 zeroize^11.8.1up to date

Dev dependencies

(6 total, 5 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-std^1.6.21.13.0up to date
 base64^0.13.00.22.1out of date
 criterion^0.30.5.1out of date
 multihash^0.140.19.2out of date
 quickcheck^0.9.01.0.3out of date
 rand^0.70.8.5out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

ed25519-dalek: Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on `ed25519-dalek`

RUSTSEC-2022-0093

Versions of ed25519-dalek prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.

Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S part of the signature, but not in the R value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same R and only differ on the S part.

Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.

Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled "hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.