This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate sfu

Dependencies

(23 total, 14 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 retty^0.27.00.29.0out of date
 bytes ⚠️^1.51.11.1maybe insecure
 log^0.40.4.29up to date
 base64^0.220.22.1up to date
 serde^11.0.228up to date
 serde_json^11.0.149up to date
 rand^0.80.10.0out of date
 rcgen^0.120.14.7out of date
 ring ⚠️^0.170.17.14maybe insecure
 sha2^0.100.10.9up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.210.23.36out of date
 url^22.5.8up to date
 hex^0.40.4.3up to date
 opentelemetry^0.22.00.31.0out of date
 rtc-shared^0.1.10.9.0out of date
 rtc-sdp^0.1.10.9.0out of date
 rtc-stun^0.1.10.9.0out of date
 rtc-rtp^0.10.9.0out of date
 rtc-rtcp^0.10.9.0out of date
 rtc-srtp^0.1.10.9.0out of date
 rtc-dtls^0.1.10.9.0out of date
 rtc-sctp^0.1.10.9.0out of date
 rtc-datachannel^0.10.9.0out of date

Dev dependencies

(21 total, 5 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 chrono^0.4.340.4.43up to date
 env_logger^0.110.11.9up to date
 clap^4.54.5.59up to date
 anyhow^11.0.101up to date
 rouille^3.63.6.2up to date
 systemstat^0.20.2.6up to date
 opentelemetry_sdk^0.22.10.31.0out of date
 opentelemetry-stdout^0.3.00.31.0out of date
 wg^0.70.9.2out of date
 crossbeam-channel^0.50.5.15up to date
 ctrlc^3.43.5.2up to date
 futures^0.30.3.32up to date
 smol^22.0.2up to date
 async-broadcast^0.70.7.2up to date
 waitgroup^0.10.1.2up to date
 core_affinity^0.80.8.3up to date
 num_cpus^1.161.17.0up to date
 tokio^1.361.49.0up to date
 tokio-util^0.70.7.18up to date
 webrtc^0.10.10.17.1out of date
 hyper^0.14.281.8.1out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network input

RUSTSEC-2024-0336

If a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io does not terminate.

Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.

rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io and are not affected.

rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use complete_io and are affected.

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.