This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate hyper

Dependencies

(17 total, 4 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes ⚠️^11.11.1maybe insecure
 futures-channel^0.30.3.32up to date
 futures-core^0.30.3.32up to date
 futures-util^0.30.3.32up to date
 h2 ⚠️^0.3.240.4.13out of date
 http^0.21.4.0out of date
 http-body^0.41.0.1out of date
 httparse^1.81.10.1up to date
 httpdate^1.01.0.3up to date
 itoa^11.0.17up to date
 libc^0.20.2.182up to date
 pin-project-lite^0.2.40.2.16up to date
 socket2>=0.4.7, <0.6.00.6.2out of date
 tokio^1.271.49.0up to date
 tower-service^0.30.3.3up to date
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date
 want^0.30.3.1up to date

Dev dependencies

(13 total, 3 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 futures-util^0.30.3.32up to date
 matches^0.10.1.10up to date
 num_cpus^1.01.17.0up to date
 pnet_datalink^0.27.20.35.0out of date
 pretty_env_logger^0.40.5.0out of date
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.149up to date
 spmc^0.30.3.0up to date
 tokio^1.271.49.0up to date
 tokio-test^0.40.4.5up to date
 tokio-util^0.70.7.18up to date
 tower^0.40.5.3out of date
 url^2.22.5.8up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

h2: Degradation of service in h2 servers with CONTINUATION Flood

RUSTSEC-2024-0332

An attacker can send a flood of CONTINUATION frames, causing h2 to process them indefinitely. This results in an increase in CPU usage.

Tokio task budget helps prevent this from a complete denial-of-service, as the server can still respond to legitimate requests, albeit with increased latency.

More details at "https://seanmonstar.com/blog/hyper-http2-continuation-flood/.

Patches available for 0.4.x and 0.3.x versions.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.