This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
libp2p-mplex(10 total, 5 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| asynchronous-codec | ^0.6 | 0.7.0 | out of date |
| bytes ⚠️ | ^1 | 1.11.1 | maybe insecure |
| futures | ^0.3.1 | 0.3.32 | up to date |
| libp2p-core ⚠️ | ^0.30.0 | 0.43.2 | out of date |
| log | ^0.4 | 0.4.29 | up to date |
| nohash-hasher | ^0.2 | 0.2.0 | up to date |
| parking_lot | ^0.11 | 0.12.5 | out of date |
| rand | ^0.7 | 0.10.1 | out of date |
| smallvec | ^1.6.1 | 1.15.1 | up to date |
| unsigned-varint | ^0.7 | 0.8.0 | out of date |
(6 total, 4 outdated)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| async-std | ^1.7.0 | 1.13.2 | up to date |
| criterion | ^0.3 | 0.8.2 | out of date |
| env_logger | ^0.9 | 0.11.10 | out of date |
| futures | ^0.3 | 0.3.32 | up to date |
| quickcheck | ^0.9 | 1.1.0 | out of date |
| rand | ^0.7 | 0.10.1 | out of date |
libp2p-core: Failure to verify the public key of a `SignedEnvelope` against the `PeerId` in a `PeerRecord`Affected versions of this crate did not check that the public key the signature was created with matches the peer ID of the peer record. Any combination was considered valid.
This allows an attacker to republish an existing PeerRecord with a different PeerId.
bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition
if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset
uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.
This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.
use bytes::*;
fn main() {
let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
let mut b = a.split_off(5);
// Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
drop(a);
// Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);
// This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
b.put_u8(b'h');
}
Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.