This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate cargo-packager

Dependencies

(42 total, 15 outdated, 1 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 ar^0.90.9.0up to date
 base64^0.220.23.1out of date
 cargo-packager-utils^0.1.10.1.1up to date
 cargo_metadata^0.180.23.1out of date
 clap^4.54.6.7up to date
 dirs^6.07.0.0out of date
 dunce^11.0.5up to date
 flate2^1.01.1.11up to date
 glob^0.30.3.4up to date
 handlebars^6.06.4.4up to date
 heck^0.50.5.0up to date
 hex^0.40.4.3up to date
 tauri-icns^0.10.1.0up to date
 image^0.250.25.10up to date
 md5^0.70.8.1out of date
 minisign^0.70.10.0out of date
 native-tls^0.20.2.18up to date
 once_cell^11.21.4up to date
 os_pipe^11.2.3up to date
 plist^11.10.3up to date
 regex^11.13.1up to date
 relative-path^1.92.0.3out of date
 schemars^0.81.2.3out of date
 semver^11.0.28up to date
 serde^1.01.0.229up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.154up to date
 sha1^0.100.11.0out of date
 sha2^0.100.11.1out of date
 strsim^0.110.11.1up to date
 tar^0.40.4.46up to date
 tempfile^33.27.0up to date
 thiserror^1.02.0.21out of date
 time^0.30.3.55up to date
 toml^0.91.2.1+spec-1.1.0out of date
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.30.3.23up to date
 ureq^2.103.5.1out of date
 uuid^11.29.2up to date
 walkdir^22.5.0up to date
 windows-registry^0.50.100.0out of date
 windows-sys^0.520.61.2out of date
 zip ⚠️^0.69.5.0insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

zip: Insecure Preservation of SUID/SGID Bits during ZIP Extraction Leading to Potential Privilege Escalation

RUSTSEC-2026-0367

The zip crate preserves privileged Unix permission bits (SUID, SGID, and sticky bits) from ZIP external_attributes during extraction, instead of masking them to safe permission bits. If a privileged process (for example, root in an installer, CI/CD pipeline, or container build) extracts an attacker-controlled ZIP archive using ZipArchive::extract() or the stream extraction API, files can be created as setuid-root or setgid. This behavior allows the creation of SUID/SGID files during extraction, which can lead to local privilege escalation depending on the execution environment.

For further details see: https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/security/advisories/GHSA-vv5m-jxxh-4627

zip: zip: `ZipArchive::extract` creates symbolic links whose attacker-controlled targets are outside the destination directory

RUSTSEC-2026-0368

In zip 9.0.0-pre2, ZipArchive::extract creates a symbolic link from an archive entry after validating only the output entry path. The link target bytes are passed directly to the platform symlink API, so a malicious archive can create an entry inside the destination that resolves to an attacker-chosen path outside it. This behavior was verified on macOS and Linux. On either platform, a subsequent application read or write through that extracted entry accesses the external target with the extracting process's permissions.

For further details see: https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/security/advisories/GHSA-4v9h-p7m9-rh26

zip: ZipStreamReader::extract() and ZipArchive::extract() apply Unix permissions through symlinks without confining the target

RUSTSEC-2026-0369

ZipStreamReader::extract() applies Unix permissions through extracted symlinks without validating the symlink target stays within the destination

For further details see: https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/security/advisories/GHSA-4684-h2q9-2vcp

zip: zip: `ZipArchive::extract` aborts the process on a symlink entry with a large declared size

RUSTSEC-2026-0429

ZipArchive::extract() sizes the symlink-target buffer from the uncompressed size declared in the central directory record, before reading a single byte of entry data:

let mut target = Vec::with_capacity(file.size() as usize);

Both inputs are attacker-controlled. ZipFile::size() returns uncompressed_size verbatim from the central directory, widened to a full u64 by a ZIP64 extended-information extra field, and is never cross-checked against the compressed size, the remaining archive length, or any platform-appropriate bound for a symlink target. ZipFile::is_symlink() is decided entirely by the S_IFLNK bit of the external-attributes field.

Vec::with_capacity() is infallible: when the reservation is refused it calls handle_alloc_error() and aborts the process. This is not a Rust panic. It is not caught by catch_unwind(), is unaffected by panic = "unwind", and is not contained by running the call on a worker thread.

A 112-byte archive is sufficient. One Stored entry flagged S_IFLNK with a ZIP64 field declaring uncompressed_size = 2^62 and a zero-byte payload makes extract() fail with:

memory allocation of 4611686018427387904 bytes failed
Aborted (core dumped)          # exit 134

The declared value only needs to exceed the host's address space, not its RAM: Vec::with_capacity() maps address space without touching pages, so resident memory stays flat and the abort happens on the refused reservation itself. Under a ulimit -v cap or a memory-constrained container the threshold drops far enough that a plain 32-bit uncompressed_size with no ZIP64 field suffices.

Applications that extract archives from untrusted input are affected on Unix and Windows targets with default features and no special configuration: upload handling, mail-attachment processing, package and artefact ingestion, backup restore and container-image layer extraction. No confidentiality or integrity property is affected: there is no memory unsafety, no out-of-bounds access, no disclosure and no data corruption.

The fix landed in zip-rs/zip2#984 and shipped in 9.0.0.

For further details see: https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/security/advisories/GHSA-q7v9-x93c-xqv3