Deps.rs

typst-library 0.14.2

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/crate/typst-library/0.14.2/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/crate/typst-library/0.14.2)

This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate typst-library

Dependencies

(58 total, 11 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 az^1.21.3.0up to date
 bitflags^22.10.0up to date
 bumpalo^3.15.43.19.1up to date
 chinese-number^0.7.20.7.8up to date
 ciborium^0.2.10.2.2up to date
 codex^0.2.00.2.0up to date
 comemo^0.5.00.5.1up to date
 csv^11.4.0up to date
 ecow^0.20.2.6up to date
 flate2^11.1.9up to date
 fontdb^0.230.23.0up to date
 glidesort^0.1.20.1.2up to date
 hayagriva^0.9.10.9.1up to date
 hayro-syntax^0.4.00.5.0out of date
 icu_properties^1.42.1.2out of date
 icu_provider^1.42.1.1out of date
 icu_provider_blob^1.42.1.1out of date
 image^0.25.50.25.9up to date
 indexmap^22.13.0up to date
 kamadak-exif^0.60.6.1up to date
 kurbo^0.120.13.0out of date
 lipsum^0.90.9.1up to date
 memchr^22.7.6up to date
 palette^0.7.30.7.6up to date
 phf^0.130.13.1up to date
 png^0.170.18.0out of date
 qcms^0.3.00.3.0up to date
 rayon^1.7.01.11.0up to date
 regex ⚠️^11.12.3maybe insecure
 regex-syntax^0.80.8.9up to date
 roxmltree^0.200.21.1out of date
 rust_decimal^1.36.01.40.0up to date
 rustc-hash^2.12.1.1up to date
 rustybuzz^0.200.20.1up to date
 serde^1.0.1841.0.228up to date
 serde_json^11.0.149up to date
 serde_yaml^0.90.9.34+deprecatedup to date
 siphasher^11.0.2up to date
 smallvec^1.11.11.15.1up to date
 syntect^5.35.3.0up to date
 time^0.3.200.3.46up to date
 toml^0.80.9.11+spec-1.1.0out of date
 ttf-parser^0.25.00.25.1up to date
 two-face^0.4.30.5.1out of date
 typed-arena^22.0.2up to date
 typst-assets^0.14.20.14.2up to date
 typst-macros^0.14.20.14.2up to date
 typst-syntax^0.14.20.14.2up to date
 typst-timing^0.14.20.14.2up to date
 typst-utils^0.14.20.14.2up to date
 unicode-math-class^0.10.1.0up to date
 unicode-normalization^0.1.240.1.25up to date
 unicode-segmentation^11.12.0up to date
 unscanny^0.10.1.0up to date
 usvg^0.450.46.0out of date
 utf8_iter^1.0.41.0.4up to date
 wasmi^0.51.51.0.8out of date
 xmlwriter^0.1.00.1.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

regex: Regexes with large repetitions on empty sub-expressions take a very long time to parse

RUSTSEC-2022-0013

The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the regex crate did not properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted regexes.

This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability is "high" when the regex crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses of the regex crate are not affected by this vulnerability.

Overview

The regex crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's API.

Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.

Affected versions

All versions of the regex crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this issue. The fix is include starting from regex 1.5.5.

Mitigations

We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately to the latest version of the regex crate.

Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.

Acknowledgements

We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the Rust security policy, and for helping review the fix.

We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.