Deps.rs

taxy 0.3.30

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/crate/taxy/0.3.30/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/crate/taxy/0.3.30)

This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate taxy

Dependencies

(61 total, 10 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^1.0.711.0.95up to date
 arc-swap^1.6.01.7.1up to date
 argon2^0.5.00.5.3up to date
 async-trait^0.1.710.1.85up to date
 backoff^0.4.00.4.0up to date
 base64^0.22.00.22.1up to date
 brotli^6.0.07.0.0out of date
 clap^4.3.114.5.26up to date
 dashmap^6.0.16.1.0up to date
 directories^5.0.16.0.0out of date
 flate2^1.0.261.0.35up to date
 fnv^1.0.71.0.7up to date
 futures^0.3.280.3.31up to date
 globwalk^0.9.10.9.1up to date
 hex^0.4.30.4.3up to date
 humantime-serde^1.1.11.1.1up to date
 hyper^0.14.271.5.2out of date
 include_dir^0.7.30.7.4up to date
 indexmap^2.0.02.7.0up to date
 instant-acme^0.7.10.7.2up to date
 log^0.4.190.4.22up to date
 mime_guess^2.0.42.0.5up to date
 network-interface^2.0.02.0.0up to date
 once_cell^1.18.01.20.2up to date
 percent-encoding^2.3.02.3.1up to date
 phf^0.11.20.11.3up to date
 pin-project-lite^0.2.100.2.16up to date
 pkcs8^0.10.20.10.2up to date
 rand^0.8.50.8.5up to date
 rcgen^0.13.00.13.2up to date
 rpassword^7.2.07.3.1up to date
 rustls-native-certs^0.7.00.8.1out of date
 rustls-pemfile^2.0.02.2.0up to date
 sailfish^0.8.00.9.0out of date
 serde^1.0.1711.0.217up to date
 serde_default^0.2.00.2.0up to date
 serde_derive^1.0.1711.0.217up to date
 serde_json^1.0.1021.0.135up to date
 serde_qs^0.13.00.13.0up to date
 sha2^0.10.70.10.8up to date
 shellexpand^3.1.03.1.0up to date
 sqlx ⚠️^0.8.00.8.3maybe insecure
 tar^0.4.380.4.43up to date
 taxy-api^0.1.180.2.0out of date
 thiserror^1.0.432.0.11out of date
 time^0.3.360.3.37up to date
 tokio^1.29.11.43.0up to date
 tokio-rustls^0.25.00.26.1out of date
 tokio-stream^0.1.140.1.17up to date
 toml^0.8.80.8.19up to date
 toml_edit^0.22.90.22.22up to date
 totp-rs^5.1.05.6.0up to date
 tracing^0.1.370.1.41up to date
 tracing-appender^0.2.20.2.3up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.3.170.3.19up to date
 url^2.4.02.5.4up to date
 utoipa^4.2.05.3.1out of date
 utoipa-swagger-ui^7.0.08.1.1out of date
 warp^0.3.60.3.7up to date
 webpki^0.22.40.22.4up to date
 x509-parser^0.16.00.16.0up to date

Dev dependencies

(5 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 mockito^1.1.01.6.1up to date
 net2^0.2.390.2.39up to date
 reqwest^0.12.10.12.12up to date
 tokio-tungstenite^0.21.00.26.1out of date
 warp^0.3.60.3.7up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

sqlx: Binary Protocol Misinterpretation caused by Truncating or Overflowing Casts

RUSTSEC-2024-0363

The following presentation at this year's DEF CON was brought to our attention on the SQLx Discord:

SQL Injection isn't Dead: Smuggling Queries at the Protocol Level
http://web.archive.org/web/20240812130923/https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Paul%20Gerste%20-%20SQL%20Injection%20Isn't%20Dead%20Smuggling%20Queries%20at%20the%20Protocol%20Level.pdf
(Archive link for posterity.)

Essentially, encoding a value larger than 4GiB can cause the length prefix in the protocol to overflow, causing the server to interpret the rest of the string as binary protocol commands or other data.

It appears SQLx does perform truncating casts in a way that could be problematic, for example: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/6f2905695b9606b5f51b40ce10af63ac9e696bb8/sqlx-postgres/src/arguments.rs#L163

This code has existed essentially since the beginning, so it is reasonable to assume that all published versions <= 0.8.0 are affected.

Mitigation

As always, you should make sure your application is validating untrustworthy user input. Reject any input over 4 GiB, or any input that could encode to a string longer than 4 GiB. Dynamically built queries are also potentially problematic if it pushes the message size over this 4 GiB bound.

Encode::size_hint() can be used for sanity checks, but do not assume that the size returned is accurate. For example, the Json<T> and Text<T> adapters have no reasonable way to predict or estimate the final encoded size, so they just return size_of::<T>() instead.

For web application backends, consider adding some middleware that limits the size of request bodies by default.

Resolution

sqlx 0.8.1 has been released with the fix: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#081---2024-08-23

Postgres users are advised to upgrade ASAP as a possible exploit has been demonstrated: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/issues/3440#issuecomment-2307956901

MySQL and SQLite do not appear to be exploitable, but upgrading is recommended nonetheless.