This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate ssh-key

Dependencies

(18 total, 10 outdated, 1 insecure, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 aes^0.80.8.4up to date
 bcrypt-pbkdf^0.90.10.0out of date
 num-bigint-dig^0.80.8.4up to date
 ctr^0.90.9.2up to date
 dsa^0.4.10.6.3out of date
 ed25519-dalek ⚠️^1.0.12.1.1out of date
 ssh-encoding^0.10.2.0out of date
 p256^0.110.13.2out of date
 p384^0.110.13.1out of date
 rand_core^0.60.9.3out of date
 rsa ⚠️^0.70.9.8insecure
 sec1^0.30.7.3out of date
 serde^11.0.219up to date
 sha1^0.100.10.6up to date
 sha2^0.10.60.10.8up to date
 signature^1.6.42.2.0out of date
 subtle^22.6.1up to date
 zeroize^11.8.1up to date

Dev dependencies

(3 total, 2 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 hex-literal^0.3.41.0.0out of date
 rand_chacha^0.30.9.0out of date
 tempfile^33.19.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

ed25519-dalek: Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on `ed25519-dalek`

RUSTSEC-2022-0093

Versions of ed25519-dalek prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.

Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S part of the signature, but not in the R value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same R and only differ on the S part.

Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.

Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled "hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.

rsa: Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels

RUSTSEC-2023-0071

Impact

Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.

Patches

No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.

Workarounds

The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.

References

This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.