This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate object_store

Dependencies

(22 total, 9 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-trait^0.1.530.1.88up to date
 base64^0.210.22.1out of date
 bytes^1.01.10.1up to date
 chrono^0.4.310.4.41up to date
 futures^0.30.3.31up to date
 humantime^2.12.2.0up to date
 hyper ⚠️^0.141.6.0out of date
 itertools^0.11.00.14.0out of date
 parking_lot^0.120.12.4up to date
 percent-encoding^2.12.3.1up to date
 quick-xml^0.30.00.38.0out of date
 rand^0.80.9.1out of date
 reqwest^0.110.12.22out of date
 ring ⚠️^0.160.17.14out of date
 rustls-pemfile^1.02.2.0out of date
 serde^1.01.0.219up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.140up to date
 snafu^0.70.8.6out of date
 tokio^1.25.01.46.1up to date
 tracing^0.10.1.41up to date
 url^2.22.5.4up to date
 walkdir^22.5.0up to date

Dev dependencies

(5 total, 3 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 futures-test^0.30.3.31up to date
 hyper^0.14.241.6.0out of date
 nix^0.27.10.30.1out of date
 rand^0.80.9.1out of date
 tempfile^3.1.03.20.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.