This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers.
Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.
To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents
but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.
hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss
When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation,
this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.
To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send
requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible,
any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.
capnp: out-of-bounds read possible when setting list-of-pointers
If a message consumer expects data
of type "list of pointers",
and if the consumer performs certain specific actions on such data,
then a message producer can cause the consumer to read out-of-bounds memory.
This could trigger a process crash in the consumer,
or in some cases could allow exfiltration of private in-memory data.
The C++ Cap'n Proto library is also affected by this bug.
See the advisory
on the main Cap'n Proto repo for a succinct description of
the exact circumstances in which the problem can arise.