This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate pgp

Dependencies

(39 total, 2 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 aes^0.80.8.2up to date
 base64^0.13.00.13.1up to date
 bitfield^0.140.14.0up to date
 block-padding^0.3.20.3.2up to date
 blowfish^0.90.9.1up to date
 byteorder^1.41.4.3up to date
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.23maybe insecure
 cast5^0.11.00.11.1up to date
 cfb-mode^0.8.10.8.2up to date
 cipher^0.40.4.3up to date
 crc24^0.10.1.6up to date
 derive_builder^0.11.10.12.0out of date
 des^0.80.8.1up to date
 digest^0.100.10.6up to date
 generic-array^0.140.14.6up to date
 hex^0.40.4.3up to date
 log^0.4.60.4.17up to date
 md-5^0.10.50.10.5up to date
 nom^4.27.1.1out of date
 num-derive^0.3.00.3.3up to date
 num-traits^0.2.60.2.15up to date
 rand^0.80.8.5up to date
 ripemd^0.1.30.1.3up to date
 rsa^0.7.00.7.2up to date
 sha1^0.10.50.10.5up to date
 sha2^0.10.60.10.6up to date
 sha3^0.10.50.10.6up to date
 signature^1.3.01.6.4up to date
 smallvec^1.8.01.10.0up to date
 thiserror^1.0.301.0.37up to date
 twofish^0.70.7.1up to date
 zeroize^1.51.5.7up to date
 getrandom^0.2.60.2.8up to date
 buf_redux^0.8.40.8.4up to date
 ed25519-dalek^1.01.0.1up to date
 flate2^1.01.0.25up to date
 gperftools^0.2.00.2.0up to date
 num-bigint-dig^0.8.10.8.2up to date
 x25519-dalek^1.01.2.0up to date

Dev dependencies

(9 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 glob^0.30.3.0up to date
 hex-literal^0.30.3.4up to date
 pretty_assertions^11.3.0up to date
 pretty_env_logger^0.40.4.0up to date
 rand_chacha^0.30.3.1up to date
 rand_xorshift^0.30.3.0up to date
 regex ⚠️^1.51.7.0maybe insecure
 serde^1.01.0.149up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.89up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

regex: Regexes with large repetitions on empty sub-expressions take a very long time to parse

RUSTSEC-2022-0013

The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the regex crate did not properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted regexes.

This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability is "high" when the regex crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses of the regex crate are not affected by this vulnerability.

Overview

The regex crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's API.

Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.

Affected versions

All versions of the regex crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this issue. The fix is include starting from regex 1.5.5.

Mitigations

We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately to the latest version of the regex crate.

Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.

Acknowledgements

We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the Rust security policy, and for helping review the fix.

We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.