This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate xet-data

Dependencies

(26 total, 2 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^11.0.102up to date
 async-trait^0.10.1.89up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.111.11.1maybe insecure
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.44maybe insecure
 clap^44.6.1up to date
 gearhash^0.10.1.3up to date
 http^11.4.0up to date
 itertools^0.140.14.0up to date
 lazy_static^1.51.5.0up to date
 more-asserts^0.30.3.1up to date
 pyo3^0.260.28.3out of date
 rand^0.100.10.1up to date
 serde^11.0.228up to date
 serde_json^11.0.149up to date
 sha2^0.100.11.0out of date
 tempfile^3.253.27.0up to date
 thiserror^2.02.0.18up to date
 tokio^1.491.52.3up to date
 tokio-util^0.70.7.18up to date
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date
 url^2.52.5.8up to date
 uuid^11.23.1up to date
 walkdir^22.5.0up to date
 xet-client^1.5.21.5.2up to date
 xet-core-structures^1.5.21.5.2up to date
 xet-runtime^1.5.21.5.2up to date

Dev dependencies

(8 total, 2 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 criterion^0.40.8.2out of date
 ctor^0.61.0.5out of date
 dirs^6.06.0.0up to date
 rand^0.100.10.1up to date
 regex ⚠️^11.12.3maybe insecure
 serial_test^33.4.0up to date
 tempfile^3.253.27.0up to date
 tracing-test^0.20.2.6up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

regex: Regexes with large repetitions on empty sub-expressions take a very long time to parse

RUSTSEC-2022-0013

The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the regex crate did not properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted regexes.

This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability is "high" when the regex crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses of the regex crate are not affected by this vulnerability.

Overview

The regex crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's API.

Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.

Affected versions

All versions of the regex crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this issue. The fix is include starting from regex 1.5.5.

Mitigations

We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately to the latest version of the regex crate.

Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.

Acknowledgements

We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the Rust security policy, and for helping review the fix.

We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.