This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tokio-util

Dependencies

(10 total, 1 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes ⚠️^1.5.01.11.1maybe insecure
 futures-core^0.3.00.3.31up to date
 futures-io^0.3.00.3.31up to date
 futures-sink^0.3.00.3.31up to date
 futures-util^0.3.00.3.31up to date
 hashbrown ⚠️^0.15.00.16.1out of date
 pin-project-lite^0.2.110.2.16up to date
 slab^0.4.40.4.12up to date
 tokio^1.44.01.49.0up to date
 tracing^0.1.290.1.44up to date

Dev dependencies

(9 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-stream^0.3.00.3.6up to date
 futures^0.3.00.3.31up to date
 futures-test^0.3.50.3.31up to date
 loom^0.70.7.2up to date
 parking_lot^0.12.00.12.5up to date
 tempfile^3.1.03.24.0up to date
 tokio ⚠️^1.0.01.49.0maybe insecure
 tokio-stream^0.10.1.18up to date
 tokio-test^0.4.00.4.5up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

hashbrown: Borsh serialization of HashMap is non-canonical

RUSTSEC-2024-0402

The borsh serialization of the HashMap did not follow the borsh specification. It potentially produced non-canonical encodings dependent on insertion order. It also did not perform canonicty checks on decoding.

This can result in consensus splits and cause equivalent objects to be considered distinct.

This was patched in 0.15.1.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.