This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate trust-dns-client

Dependencies

(14 total, 5 outdated, 2 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 cfg-if^11.0.5up to date
 data-encoding^2.2.02.11.1up to date
 futures-channel^0.3.50.3.34up to date
 futures-util^0.3.50.3.34up to date
 once_cell^1.18.01.21.4up to date
 radix_trie^0.2.00.3.0out of date
 rand^0.80.10.4out of date
 rustls ⚠️^0.21.00.23.46insecure
 serde^1.01.0.229up to date
 thiserror^1.0.202.0.21out of date
 tokio^1.211.54.1up to date
 tracing^0.1.300.1.44up to date
 trust-dns-proto^0.23.20.23.2up to date
 rustls-webpki ⚠️^0.101.00.103.17insecure

Dev dependencies

(4 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 futures^0.3.50.3.34up to date
 openssl^0.10.550.10.82up to date
 tokio^1.211.54.1up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.30.3.23up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls-webpki: Name constraints for URI names were incorrectly accepted

RUSTSEC-2026-0098

Name constraints for URI names were ignored and therefore accepted.

Note this library does not provide an API for asserting URI names, and URI name constraints are otherwise not implemented. URI name constraints are now rejected unconditionally.

Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.

This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5. Thank you to @1seal for the report.

rustls-webpki: Name constraints were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name

RUSTSEC-2026-0099

Permitted subtree name constraints for DNS names were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name.

This was incorrect because, given a name constraint of accept.example.com, *.example.com could feasibly allow a name of reject.example.com which is outside the constraint. This is very similar to CVE-2025-61727.

Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.

This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh. Thank you to @1seal for the report.

rustls-webpki: Reachable panic in certificate revocation list parsing

RUSTSEC-2026-0104

A panic was reachable when parsing certificate revocation lists via [BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der] or [OwnedCertRevocationList::from_der]. This was the result of mishandling a syntactically valid empty BIT STRING appearing in the onlySomeReasons element of a IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension.

This panic is reachable prior to a CRL's signature being verified.

Applications that do not use CRLs are not affected.

Thank you to @tynus3 for the report.

rustls: `Debug` impls for client session values expose TLS secrets

RUSTSEC-2026-0346

The Debug implementations of Tls12ClientSessionValue and Tls13ClientSessionValue were derived, and so included the TLS 1.2 master secret or TLS 1.3 resumption PSK in their output.

Custom ClientSessionStore implementations that format these values with Debug (for example, when logging) could disclose these secrets to readers of the logs. This conflicts with rustls's key-material redaction policy.

Ordinary connection and built-in session cache Debug output is redacted and is not affected.

rustls: Unauthenticated ServerHello can downgrade later connections to classical key exchange

RUSTSEC-2026-0349

The client recorded the server-selected key exchange group for each server name when processing the ServerHello, before the server was authenticated. This record is used to predict which key share to send in future ClientHellos to that server name.

A network attacker can answer one connection attempt with a ServerHello selecting X25519, and then close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that name carry only an X25519 key share, while supported_groups still lists X25519MLKEM768 first. If the genuine server accepts that share rather than sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake completes with classical-only key exchange and no error. This persists for as long as the entry stays in the client's session store.

The impact is loss of post-quantum confidentiality for affected connections ("harvest now, decrypt later"). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass.

The following are not affected:

  • connections to servers which send a HelloRetryRequest for their preferred group,
  • clients with resumption disabled (as nothing is stored), and
  • other server names.

This behaviour is discussed in draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction, so the practical impact depends largely on server policy.

rustls-webpki: Certificate verification may accept distrusted intermediates

RUSTSEC-2026-0382

Affected versions may accept certificate paths containing distrusted emSign intermediate public keys when the configured trust anchors allow such paths. The private keys corresponding to these intermediates are now well known.

Versions 0.103.16 and 0.104.0-alpha.8 reject paths containing these public keys.