This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tracing-subscriber


(15 total, 2 outdated, 4 possibly insecure)

 ansi_term^ to date
 chrono ⚠️^ insecure
 lazy_static^11.4.0up to date
 matchers^ of date
 parking_lot>=0.7, <= of date
 regex ⚠️^11.6.0maybe insecure
 serde^ to date
 serde_json^ to date
 sharded-slab^ to date
 smallvec ⚠️^11.9.0maybe insecure
 thread_local ⚠️^ insecure
 tracing^ to date
 tracing-core^ to date
 tracing-log^ to date
 tracing-serde^ to date

Dev dependencies

(7 total, 2 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

 criterion^ of date
 log^ to date
 regex ⚠️^11.6.0maybe insecure
 tokio ⚠️^ of date
 tracing^ to date
 tracing-futures^ to date
 tracing-log^ to date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations



Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.


No workarounds are known.


smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many


A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.

tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channel


If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.

thread_local: Data race in `Iter` and `IterMut`


In the affected version of this crate, {Iter, IterMut}::next used a weaker memory ordering when loading values than what was required, exposing a potential data race when iterating over a ThreadLocal's values.

Crates using Iter::next, or IterMut::next are affected by this issue.

regex: Regexes with large repetitions on empty sub-expressions take a very long time to parse


The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the regex crate did not properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted regexes.

This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability is "high" when the regex crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses of the regex crate are not affected by this vulnerability.


The regex crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's API.

Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.

Affected versions

All versions of the regex crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this issue. The fix is include starting from regex 1.5.5.


We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately to the latest version of the regex crate.

Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.


We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the Rust security policy, and for helping review the fix.

We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.