This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate rustls

Dependencies

(12 total, 2 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 aws-lc-rs^1.121.16.2up to date
 brotli^88.0.2up to date
 brotli-decompressor^5.0.05.0.0up to date
 hashbrown ⚠️^0.150.16.1out of date
 log^0.4.80.4.29up to date
 once_cell^1.161.21.4up to date
 rustls-pki-types^1.111.14.0up to date
 ring ⚠️^0.170.17.14maybe insecure
 subtle^2.5.02.6.1up to date
 rustls-webpki ⚠️^0.103.20.103.10maybe insecure
 zeroize^1.71.8.2up to date
 zlib-rs^0.50.6.3out of date

Dev dependencies

(13 total, 3 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 base64^0.220.22.1up to date
 bencher^0.1.50.1.5up to date
 env_logger^0.110.11.10up to date
 hex^0.40.4.3up to date
 log^0.4.80.4.29up to date
 macro_rules_attribute^0.20.2.2up to date
 num-bigint^0.4.40.4.6up to date
 rcgen^0.130.14.7out of date
 serde^11.0.228up to date
 serde_json^11.0.149up to date
 time ⚠️^0.3.60.3.47maybe insecure
 webpki-roots^0.261.0.6out of date
 x509-parser^0.170.18.1out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

hashbrown: Borsh serialization of HashMap is non-canonical

RUSTSEC-2024-0402

The borsh serialization of the HashMap did not follow the borsh specification. It potentially produced non-canonical encodings dependent on insertion order. It also did not perform canonicty checks on decoding.

This can result in consensus splits and cause equivalent objects to be considered distinct.

This was patched in 0.15.1.

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.

time: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion

RUSTSEC-2026-0009

Impact

When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary, non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.

Patches

A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned rather than exhausting the stack.

Workarounds

Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.

rustls-webpki: CRLs not considered authoritative by Distribution Point due to faulty matching logic

RUSTSEC-2026-0049

If a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored.

The impact was that correctly provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.

This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)

More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.

This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4. Thank you to @1seal for the report.