This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate minreq

Dependencies

(14 total, 5 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 base64^0.120.22.1out of date
 log^0.4.00.4.25up to date
 native-tls^0.20.2.13up to date
 once_cell^1.14.01.20.3up to date
 openssl ⚠️^0.10.290.10.71maybe insecure
 openssl-probe^0.10.1.6up to date
 punycode^0.4.10.4.1up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.21.10.23.23out of date
 rustls-native-certs^0.6.10.8.1out of date
 rustls-webpki ⚠️^0.101.00.102.8out of date
 serde^1.0.1011.0.217up to date
 serde_json^1.0.01.0.138up to date
 urlencoding^2.1.02.1.3up to date
 webpki-roots^0.25.20.26.8out of date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 chrono ⚠️^0.4.00.4.39maybe insecure
 tiny_http^0.120.12.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

rustls-webpki: rustls-webpki: CPU denial of service in certificate path building

RUSTSEC-2023-0053

When this crate is given a pathological certificate chain to validate, it will spend CPU time exponential with the number of candidate certificates at each step of path building.

Both TLS clients and TLS servers that accept client certificate are affected.

We now give each path building operation a budget of 100 signature verifications.

The original webpki crate is also affected.

This was previously reported in the original crate https://github.com/briansmith/webpki/issues/69 and re-reported to us recently by Luke Malinowski.

rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network input

RUSTSEC-2024-0336

If a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io does not terminate.

Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.

rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io and are not affected.

rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use complete_io and are affected.

openssl: ssl::select_next_proto use after free

RUSTSEC-2025-0004

In openssl versions before 0.10.70, ssl::select_next_proto can return a slice pointing into the server argument's buffer but with a lifetime bound to the client argument. In situations where the server buffer's lifetime is shorter than the client buffer's, this can cause a use after free. This could cause the server to crash or to return arbitrary memory contents to the client.

openssl 0.10.70 fixes the signature of ssl::select_next_proto to properly constrain the output buffer's lifetime to that of both input buffers.

In standard usage of ssl::select_next_proto in the callback passed to SslContextBuilder::set_alpn_select_callback, code is only affected if the server buffer is constructed within the callback. For example:

Not vulnerable - the server buffer has a 'static lifetime:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(b"\x02h2", client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Not vulnerable - the server buffer outlives the handshake:

let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Vulnerable - the server buffer is freed when the callback returns:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});