This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate libp2p-noise

Dependencies

(13 total, 4 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes^11.8.0up to date
 curve25519-dalek ⚠️^3.0.04.1.3out of date
 futures^0.3.10.3.31up to date
 lazy_static^1.21.5.0up to date
 libp2p-core^0.32.00.42.0out of date
 log^0.40.4.22up to date
 prost^0.90.13.3out of date
 rand^0.8.30.8.5up to date
 sha2^0.10.00.10.8up to date
 snow ⚠️^0.9.00.9.6maybe insecure
 static_assertions^11.1.0up to date
 x25519-dalek^1.1.02.0.1out of date
 zeroize^11.8.1up to date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, 3 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-io^1.2.02.3.4out of date
 env_logger^0.9.00.11.5out of date
 quickcheck^0.9.01.0.3out of date
 sodiumoxide^0.2.50.2.7up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

snow: Unauthenticated Nonce Increment in snow

RUSTSEC-2024-0011

There was a logic bug where unauthenticated payloads could still cause a nonce increment in snow's internal state. For an attacker with privileges to inject packets into the channel over which the Noise session operates, this could allow a denial-of-service attack which could prevent message delivery by sending garbage data.

Note that this only affects those who are using the stateful TransportState, not those using StatelessTransportState.

This has been patched in version 0.9.5, and all users are recommended to update.

curve25519-dalek: Timing variability in `curve25519-dalek`'s `Scalar29::sub`/`Scalar52::sub`

RUSTSEC-2024-0344

Timing variability of any kind is problematic when working with potentially secret values such as elliptic curve scalars, and such issues can potentially leak private keys and other secrets. Such a problem was recently discovered in curve25519-dalek.

The Scalar29::sub (32-bit) and Scalar52::sub (64-bit) functions contained usage of a mask value inside a loop where LLVM saw an opportunity to insert a branch instruction (jns on x86) to conditionally bypass this code section when the mask value is set to zero as can be seen in godbolt:

A similar problem was recently discovered in the Kyber reference implementation:

https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/hqbtIGFKIpU/m/cnE3pbueBgAJ

As discussed on that thread, one portable solution, which is also used in this PR, is to introduce a volatile read as an optimization barrier, which prevents the compiler from optimizing it away.

The fix can be validated in godbolt here:

The problem was discovered and the solution independently verified by Alexander Wagner [email protected] and Lea Themint [email protected] using their DATA tool:

https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/DATA