This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate libp2p-kad

Dependencies

(18 total, 10 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 arrayvec^0.5.10.7.4out of date
 bytes^0.51.6.0out of date
 either^1.51.12.0up to date
 fnv^1.01.0.7up to date
 futures^0.3.10.3.30up to date
 futures_codec^0.40.4.1up to date
 libp2p-core^0.20.00.41.2out of date
 libp2p-swarm^0.20.00.44.2out of date
 log^0.40.4.21up to date
 multihash ⚠️^0.11.00.19.1out of date
 prost^0.6.10.12.6out of date
 rand^0.7.20.8.5out of date
 sha2^0.8.00.10.8out of date
 smallvec ⚠️^1.01.13.2maybe insecure
 uint^0.80.9.5out of date
 unsigned-varint^0.40.8.0out of date
 void^1.01.0.2up to date
 wasm-timer^0.20.2.5up to date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 futures-timer^3.03.0.3up to date
 quickcheck^0.9.01.0.3out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

multihash: Unexpected panic in multihash `from_slice` parsing code

RUSTSEC-2020-0068

In versions prior 0.11.3 it's possible to make from_slice panic by feeding it certain malformed input. It's never documented that from_slice (and from_bytes which wraps it) can panic, and its' return type (Result<Self, DecodeError>) suggests otherwise.

In practice, from_slice/from_bytes is frequently used in networking code (for example in rust-libp2p) and is being called with unsanitized data from untrusted sources. This can allow attackers to cause DoS by causing an unexpected panic in the network client's code.

smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many

RUSTSEC-2021-0003

A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.