This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.
cargo-web(41 total, 26 outdated, 2 insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| ansi_term | ^0.11 | 0.12.1 | out of date |
| atty | ^0.2 | 0.2.14 | up to date |
| base-x | ^0.2 | 0.3.0 | out of date |
| cargo_metadata | ^0.6 | 0.23.1 | out of date |
| clap | ^2 | 4.6.7 | out of date |
| digest | ^0.8 | 0.11.3 | out of date |
| directories | ^2 | 6.0.0 | out of date |
| env_logger | ^0.6 | 0.11.11 | out of date |
| failure | ^0.1 | 0.1.8 | up to date |
| futures | ^0.1.17 | 0.3.34 | out of date |
| handlebars | ^1 | 6.4.4 | out of date |
| http | ^0.1.13 | 1.5.0 | out of date |
| hyper ⚠️ | ^0.12.12 | 1.11.1 | insecure |
| indexmap | ^1 | 2.14.2 | out of date |
| lazy_static | ^1 | 1.5.0 | up to date |
| libflate | ^0.1 | 2.3.2 | out of date |
| log | ^0.4 | 0.4.34 | up to date |
| memmap | ^0.7 | 0.7.0 | up to date |
| mime_guess | ^1 | 2.0.5 | out of date |
| notify | ^4 | 8.2.0 | out of date |
| open | ^1 | 5.4.4 | out of date |
| openssl-sys | =0.9.45 | 0.9.117 | out of date |
| parity-wasm | ^0.35 | 0.45.0 | out of date |
| pbr | ^1 | 1.1.1 | up to date |
| percent-encoding | ^1 | 2.3.2 | out of date |
| regex | ^1 | 1.13.1 | up to date |
| reqwest | ^0.9 | 0.13.5 | out of date |
| rustc-demangle | ^0.1.5 | 0.1.28 | up to date |
| semver | ^0.9 | 1.0.28 | out of date |
| serde | ^1 | 1.0.229 | up to date |
| serde_derive | ^1 | 1.0.229 | up to date |
| serde_json | ^1 | 1.0.151 | up to date |
| sha1 | ^0.6 | 0.11.0 | out of date |
| sha2 | ^0.8 | 0.11.0 | out of date |
| structopt | ^0.2.14 | 0.3.26 | out of date |
| tar | ^0.4 | 0.4.46 | up to date |
| tempfile | ^3 | 3.27.0 | up to date |
| toml | ^0.4 | 1.1.6+spec-1.1.0 | out of date |
| unicode_categories | ^0.1.1 | 0.1.1 | up to date |
| walkdir | ^2 | 2.5.0 | up to date |
| websocket ⚠️ | ^0.21 | 0.27.1 | insecure |
hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smugglinghyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers.
Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.
To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents
but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.
hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data lossWhen decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation,
this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.
To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send
requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible,
any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.
websocket: Unbounded memory allocation based on untrusted lengthUntrusted websocket connections can cause an out-of-memory (OOM) process abort in a client or a server.
The root cause of the issue is during dataframe parsing.
Affected versions would allocate a buffer based on the declared dataframe size, which may come from an untrusted source.
When Vec::with_capacity fails to allocate, the default Rust allocator will abort the current process, killing all threads. This affects only sync (non-Tokio) implementation. Async version also does not limit memory, but does not use with_capacity, so DoS can happen only when bytes for oversized dataframe or message actually got delivered by the attacker.
This is a security concern for you, if
The crashes are fixed in version 0.26.5 by imposing default dataframe size limits. Affected users are advised to update to this version.
Note that default memory limits are rather large (100MB dataframes and 200 MB messages), so they can still cause DoS in some environments (i.e. 32-bit). New API has been added to fine tune those limits for specific applications.
This issue was reported by Evan Richter at ForAllSecure and found with Mayhem and Cargo Fuzz.