This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate bonsaidb-server

Dependencies

(30 total, 10 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-acme^0.4.00.5.0out of date
 async-lock^23.4.0out of date
 async-trait^0.10.1.83up to date
 base64^0.21.00.22.1out of date
 bincode^11.3.3up to date
 bonsaidb-core=0.5.00.5.0up to date
 bonsaidb-local=0.5.00.5.0up to date
 bonsaidb-utils=0.5.00.5.0up to date
 cfg-if^11.0.0up to date
 clap^4.1.44.5.21up to date
 derive-where~1.2.01.2.7up to date
 env_logger^0.10.00.11.5out of date
 fabruic^0.1.00.1.0up to date
 flume^0.11.00.11.1up to date
 futures^0.30.3.31up to date
 hyper ⚠️^0.141.5.1out of date
 itertools^0.11.00.13.0out of date
 log^0.40.4.22up to date
 parking_lot^0.12.00.12.3up to date
 pem^3.0.23.0.4up to date
 pot^3.0.03.0.1up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.21.60.23.17out of date
 serde^11.0.215up to date
 sha-1^0.100.10.1up to date
 signal-hook^0.30.3.17up to date
 thiserror^12.0.3out of date
 tokio ⚠️^1.16.11.41.1maybe insecure
 tokio-rustls^0.24.10.26.0out of date
 tokio-tungstenite^0.20.00.24.0out of date
 tracing^0.10.1.40up to date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^11.0.93up to date
 bonsaidb-core=0.5.00.5.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network input

RUSTSEC-2024-0336

If a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io does not terminate.

Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.

rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io and are not affected.

rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use complete_io and are affected.