This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate attohttpc

Dependencies

(16 total, 4 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 base64^0.130.22.0out of date
 encoding_rs^0.80.8.34up to date
 encoding_rs_io^0.10.1.7up to date
 flate2^1.01.0.28up to date
 http^0.21.1.0out of date
 log^0.40.4.21up to date
 mime^0.30.3.17up to date
 multipart^0.180.18.0up to date
 native-tls^0.20.2.11up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.200.23.5out of date
 serde^11.0.198up to date
 serde_json^11.0.116up to date
 serde_urlencoded^0.70.7.1up to date
 url^22.5.0up to date
 webpki ⚠️^0.220.22.4maybe insecure
 webpki-roots^0.220.26.1out of date

Dev dependencies

(10 total, 3 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^11.0.82up to date
 env_logger^0.90.11.3out of date
 futures^0.30.3.30up to date
 futures-util^0.30.3.30up to date
 hyper ⚠️^0.141.3.1out of date
 lazy_static^11.4.0up to date
 tokio ⚠️^11.37.0maybe insecure
 tokio-rustls^0.220.26.0out of date
 tokio-stream^0.10.1.15up to date
 warp ⚠️^0.30.3.7maybe insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

warp: Improper validation of Windows paths could lead to directory traversal attack

RUSTSEC-2022-0082

Path resolution in warp::filters::fs::dir didn't correctly validate Windows paths meaning paths like /foo/bar/c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png would be allowed and respond with the contents of c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png. Thus users could potentially read files anywhere on the filesystem.

This only impacts Windows. Linux and other unix likes are not impacted by this.

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

webpki: webpki: CPU denial of service in certificate path building

RUSTSEC-2023-0052

When this crate is given a pathological certificate chain to validate, it will spend CPU time exponential with the number of candidate certificates at each step of path building.

Both TLS clients and TLS servers that accept client certificate are affected.

This was previously reported in https://github.com/briansmith/webpki/issues/69 and re-reported recently by Luke Malinowski.

webpki 0.22.1 included a partial fix and webpki 0.22.2 added further fixes.

rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network input

RUSTSEC-2024-0336

If a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io does not terminate.

Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.

rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io and are not affected.

rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use complete_io and are affected.