This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate attohttpc


(16 total, 4 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

 base64^ of date
 encoding_rs^ to date
 encoding_rs_io^ to date
 flate2^ to date
 http^ of date
 log^ to date
 mime^ to date
 multipart^ to date
 native-tls^ to date
 rustls^ of date
 serde^11.0.193up to date
 serde_json^11.0.108up to date
 serde_urlencoded^ to date
 url^22.5.0up to date
 webpki ⚠️^ insecure
 webpki-roots^ of date

Dev dependencies

(10 total, 3 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

 anyhow^11.0.75up to date
 env_logger^ of date
 futures^ to date
 futures-util^ to date
 hyper ⚠️^ of date
 lazy_static^11.4.0up to date
 tokio ⚠️^11.34.0maybe insecure
 tokio-rustls^ of date
 tokio-stream^ to date
 warp ⚠️^ insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling


hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss


When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

warp: Improper validation of Windows paths could lead to directory traversal attack


Path resolution in warp::filters::fs::dir didn't correctly validate Windows paths meaning paths like /foo/bar/c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png would be allowed and respond with the contents of c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png. Thus users could potentially read files anywhere on the filesystem.

This only impacts Windows. Linux and other unix likes are not impacted by this.

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption


On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.


Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();

webpki: webpki: CPU denial of service in certificate path building


When this crate is given a pathological certificate chain to validate, it will spend CPU time exponential with the number of candidate certificates at each step of path building.

Both TLS clients and TLS servers that accept client certificate are affected.

This was previously reported in and re-reported recently by Luke Malinowski.

webpki 0.22.1 included a partial fix and webpki 0.22.2 added further fixes.