This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
sptty(16 total, 11 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| anyhow | ^1.0 | 1.0.97 | up to date |
| base64 | ^0.13 | 0.22.1 | out of date |
| rand | ^0.8 | 0.9.0 | out of date |
| ring ⚠️ | ^0.16 | 0.17.14 | out of date |
| serde_json | ^1.0 | 1.0.140 | up to date |
| opener | ^0.5 | 0.7.2 | out of date |
| dirs | ^4.0 | 6.0.0 | out of date |
| log | ^0.4 | 0.4.27 | up to date |
| pretty_env_logger | ^0.4 | 0.5.0 | out of date |
| reqwest | ^0.11 | 0.12.15 | out of date |
| toml | ^0.5 | 0.8.20 | out of date |
| librespot | ^0.4 | 0.6.0 | out of date |
| serde | ^1.0 | 1.0.219 | up to date |
| tokio ⚠️ | ^1.20 | 1.44.1 | maybe insecure |
| hyper ⚠️ | ^0.14 | 1.6.0 | out of date |
| clap | ^3.0 | 4.5.34 | out of date |
hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smugglinghyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers.
Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.
To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents
but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.
hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data lossWhen decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation,
this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.
To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send
requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible,
any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.
tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruptionOn Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.
This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.
The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.
Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:
let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);
ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow
checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by
sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur
in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.
On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may
panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately
68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols
like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large
amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not
attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.
Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but
RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml
profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in
debug mode.