This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate clickhouse-rs

Dependencies

(27 total, 5 outdated, 1 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 byteorder^1.41.5.0up to date
 chrono-tz^0.80.10.4out of date
 crossbeam^0.80.8.5up to date
 thiserror^1.02.0.21out of date
 futures-core^0.30.3.34up to date
 futures-sink^0.30.3.34up to date
 hostname^0.30.4.2out of date
 lazy_static^1.4.01.5.1up to date
 lz4^1.241.28.1up to date
 pin-project^1.11.1.13up to date
 url^22.5.8up to date
 uuid^1.41.29.3up to date
 combine^4.64.6.9up to date
 percent-encoding^2.32.3.2up to date
 either^1.61.19.0up to date
 cfg-if^1.0.01.0.5up to date
 futures-util^0.30.3.34up to date
 tokio^1.321.54.1up to date
 async-std^1.61.13.2up to date
 log^0.4.80.4.35up to date
 native-tls^0.20.2.18up to date
 tokio-native-tls^0.30.3.1up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.22.10.23.46insecure
 rustls-pemfile^2.02.2.0up to date
 tokio-rustls^0.25.00.26.6out of date
 webpki-roots*1.0.12up to date
 chrono^0.40.4.45up to date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, 2 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 env_logger^0.100.11.11out of date
 pretty_assertions^1.3.01.4.1up to date
 rand^0.80.10.4out of date
 tokio^1.321.54.1up to date

Crate clickhouse-rs-cityhash-sys

Build dependencies

(1 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 cc^1.0.281.11.2up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls: `Debug` impls for client session values expose TLS secrets

RUSTSEC-2026-0346

The Debug implementations of Tls12ClientSessionValue and Tls13ClientSessionValue were derived, and so included the TLS 1.2 master secret or TLS 1.3 resumption PSK in their output.

Custom ClientSessionStore implementations that format these values with Debug (for example, when logging) could disclose these secrets to readers of the logs. This conflicts with rustls's key-material redaction policy.

Ordinary connection and built-in session cache Debug output is redacted and is not affected.

rustls: Unauthenticated ServerHello can downgrade later connections to classical key exchange

RUSTSEC-2026-0349

The client recorded the server-selected key exchange group for each server name when processing the ServerHello, before the server was authenticated. This record is used to predict which key share to send in future ClientHellos to that server name.

A network attacker can answer one connection attempt with a ServerHello selecting X25519, and then close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that name carry only an X25519 key share, while supported_groups still lists X25519MLKEM768 first. If the genuine server accepts that share rather than sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake completes with classical-only key exchange and no error. This persists for as long as the entry stays in the client's session store.

The impact is loss of post-quantum confidentiality for affected connections ("harvest now, decrypt later"). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass.

The following are not affected:

  • connections to servers which send a HelloRetryRequest for their preferred group,
  • clients with resumption disabled (as nothing is stored), and
  • other server names.

This behaviour is discussed in draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction, so the practical impact depends largely on server policy.