This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
noclickd(21 total, 8 outdated, 5 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| actix-cors | ^0.5.4 | 0.7.1 | out of date |
| actix-http ⚠️ | ^2.2.0 | 3.10.0 | out of date |
| actix-ratelimit | ^0.3.1 | 0.3.1 | up to date |
| actix-web | ^3.3.3 | 4.10.2 | out of date |
| anyhow | ^1.0.38 | 1.0.98 | up to date |
| clap | ^2.33.3 | 4.5.37 | out of date |
| env_logger | ^0.9.0 | 0.11.8 | out of date |
| futures | ^0.3.13 | 0.3.31 | up to date |
| kuchiki | ^0.8.1 | 0.8.1 | up to date |
| lazy_static | ^1.4.0 | 1.5.0 | up to date |
| log | ^0.4.14 | 0.4.27 | up to date |
| nanoid | ^0.4.0 | 0.4.0 | up to date |
| regex ⚠️ | ^1.4.3 | 1.11.1 | maybe insecure |
| rustls ⚠️ | ^0.18.1 | 0.23.26 | out of date |
| serde | ^1.0.123 | 1.0.219 | up to date |
| sqlx ⚠️ | ^0.4.2 | 0.8.5 | out of date |
| unicode-segmentation | ^1.7.1 | 1.12.0 | up to date |
| unidecode | ^0.3.0 | 0.3.0 | up to date |
| url | ^2.2.1 | 2.5.4 | up to date |
| config | ^0.12.0 | 0.15.11 | out of date |
| chrono ⚠️ | ^0.4.19 | 0.4.41 | maybe insecure |
chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocationsUnix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.
No workarounds are known.
actix-http: Potential request smuggling capabilities due to lack of input validationAffected versions of this crate did not properly detect invalid requests that could allow HTTP/1 request smuggling (HRS) attacks when running alongside a vulnerable front-end proxy server. This can result in leaked internal and/or user data, including credentials, when the front-end proxy is also vulnerable.
Popular front-end proxies and load balancers already mitigate HRS attacks so it is recommended that they are also kept up to date; check your specific set up. You should upgrade even if the front-end proxy receives exclusively HTTP/2 traffic and connects to the back-end using HTTP/1; several downgrade attacks are known that can also expose HRS vulnerabilities.
regex: Regexes with large repetitions on empty sub-expressions take a very long time to parseThe Rust Security Response WG was notified that the regex crate did not
properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An
attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by
sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No
known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted
regexes.
This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability
is "high" when the regex crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses
of the regex crate are not affected by this vulnerability.
The regex crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service
attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted
regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent
attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's
API.
Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.
All versions of the regex crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this
issue. The fix is include starting from regex 1.5.5.
We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately
to the latest version of the regex crate.
Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.
We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the Rust security policy, and for helping review the fix.
We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.
rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network inputIf a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io
does not terminate.
Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.
rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io
and are not affected.
rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use
complete_io and are affected.
sqlx: Binary Protocol Misinterpretation caused by Truncating or Overflowing CastsThe following presentation at this year's DEF CON was brought to our attention on the SQLx Discord:
SQL Injection isn't Dead: Smuggling Queries at the Protocol Level
http://web.archive.org/web/20240812130923/https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Paul%20Gerste%20-%20SQL%20Injection%20Isn't%20Dead%20Smuggling%20Queries%20at%20the%20Protocol%20Level.pdf
(Archive link for posterity.)
Essentially, encoding a value larger than 4GiB can cause the length prefix in the protocol to overflow, causing the server to interpret the rest of the string as binary protocol commands or other data.
It appears SQLx does perform truncating casts in a way that could be problematic, for example: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/6f2905695b9606b5f51b40ce10af63ac9e696bb8/sqlx-postgres/src/arguments.rs#L163
This code has existed essentially since the beginning,
so it is reasonable to assume that all published versions <= 0.8.0 are affected.
As always, you should make sure your application is validating untrustworthy user input. Reject any input over 4 GiB, or any input that could encode to a string longer than 4 GiB. Dynamically built queries are also potentially problematic if it pushes the message size over this 4 GiB bound.
Encode::size_hint()
can be used for sanity checks, but do not assume that the size returned is accurate.
For example, the Json<T> and Text<T> adapters have no reasonable way to predict or estimate the final encoded size,
so they just return size_of::<T>() instead.
For web application backends, consider adding some middleware that limits the size of request bodies by default.
sqlx 0.8.1 has been released with the fix: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#081---2024-08-23
Postgres users are advised to upgrade ASAP as a possible exploit has been demonstrated: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/issues/3440#issuecomment-2307956901
MySQL and SQLite do not appear to be exploitable, but upgrading is recommended nonetheless.