This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate noclickd

Dependencies

(21 total, 9 outdated, 2 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 actix-cors^0.5.40.7.2out of date
 actix-http^2.2.03.13.6out of date
 actix-ratelimit^0.3.10.3.1up to date
 actix-web^3.3.34.15.0out of date
 anyhow^1.0.381.0.104up to date
 clap^2.33.34.6.7out of date
 env_logger^0.9.00.11.11out of date
 futures^0.3.130.3.34up to date
 kuchiki^0.8.10.8.1up to date
 lazy_static^1.4.01.5.0up to date
 log^0.4.140.4.34up to date
 nanoid^0.4.00.5.0out of date
 regex^1.4.31.13.1up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.18.10.23.45insecure
 serde^1.0.1231.0.229up to date
 sqlx ⚠️^0.4.20.9.0insecure
 unicode-segmentation^1.7.11.13.3up to date
 unidecode^0.3.00.3.0up to date
 url^2.2.12.5.8up to date
 config^0.12.00.15.25out of date
 chrono^0.4.190.4.45up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network input

RUSTSEC-2024-0336

If a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io does not terminate.

Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.

rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io and are not affected.

rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use complete_io and are affected.

sqlx: Binary Protocol Misinterpretation caused by Truncating or Overflowing Casts

RUSTSEC-2024-0363

The following presentation at this year's DEF CON was brought to our attention on the SQLx Discord:

SQL Injection isn't Dead: Smuggling Queries at the Protocol Level
http://web.archive.org/web/20240812130923/https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Paul%20Gerste%20-%20SQL%20Injection%20Isn't%20Dead%20Smuggling%20Queries%20at%20the%20Protocol%20Level.pdf
(Archive link for posterity.)

Essentially, encoding a value larger than 4GiB can cause the length prefix in the protocol to overflow, causing the server to interpret the rest of the string as binary protocol commands or other data.

It appears SQLx does perform truncating casts in a way that could be problematic, for example: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/6f2905695b9606b5f51b40ce10af63ac9e696bb8/sqlx-postgres/src/arguments.rs#L163

This code has existed essentially since the beginning, so it is reasonable to assume that all published versions <= 0.8.0 are affected.

Mitigation

As always, you should make sure your application is validating untrustworthy user input. Reject any input over 4 GiB, or any input that could encode to a string longer than 4 GiB. Dynamically built queries are also potentially problematic if it pushes the message size over this 4 GiB bound.

Encode::size_hint() can be used for sanity checks, but do not assume that the size returned is accurate. For example, the Json<T> and Text<T> adapters have no reasonable way to predict or estimate the final encoded size, so they just return size_of::<T>() instead.

For web application backends, consider adding some middleware that limits the size of request bodies by default.

Resolution

sqlx 0.8.1 has been released with the fix: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#081---2024-08-23

Postgres users are advised to upgrade ASAP as a possible exploit has been demonstrated: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/issues/3440#issuecomment-2307956901

MySQL and SQLite do not appear to be exploitable, but upgrading is recommended nonetheless.