This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate snow

Dependencies

(12 total, 1 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 rand_core^0.60.9.3out of date
 subtle^2.42.6.1up to date
 aes-gcm^0.100.10.3up to date
 chacha20poly1305^0.100.10.1up to date
 blake2^0.100.10.6up to date
 sha2^0.100.10.8up to date
 curve25519-dalek ⚠️^44.1.3maybe insecure
 p256^0.13.20.13.2up to date
 pqcrypto-kyber^0.80.8.1up to date
 pqcrypto-traits^0.30.3.5up to date
 ring ⚠️^0.170.17.13maybe insecure
 byteorder^1.41.5.0up to date

Dev dependencies

(7 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 criterion^0.50.5.1up to date
 serde^1.01.0.219up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.140up to date
 serde_derive^1.01.0.219up to date
 hex^0.40.4.3up to date
 x25519-dalek^2.02.0.1up to date
 rand^0.80.9.0out of date

Build dependencies

(1 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 rustc_version^0.40.4.1up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

curve25519-dalek: Timing variability in `curve25519-dalek`'s `Scalar29::sub`/`Scalar52::sub`

RUSTSEC-2024-0344

Timing variability of any kind is problematic when working with potentially secret values such as elliptic curve scalars, and such issues can potentially leak private keys and other secrets. Such a problem was recently discovered in curve25519-dalek.

The Scalar29::sub (32-bit) and Scalar52::sub (64-bit) functions contained usage of a mask value inside a loop where LLVM saw an opportunity to insert a branch instruction (jns on x86) to conditionally bypass this code section when the mask value is set to zero as can be seen in godbolt:

A similar problem was recently discovered in the Kyber reference implementation:

https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/hqbtIGFKIpU/m/cnE3pbueBgAJ

As discussed on that thread, one portable solution, which is also used in this PR, is to introduce a volatile read as an optimization barrier, which prevents the compiler from optimizing it away.

The fix can be validated in godbolt here:

The problem was discovered and the solution independently verified by Alexander Wagner [email protected] and Lea Themint [email protected] using their DATA tool:

https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/DATA

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.