Deps.rs

cenotelie / cratery

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/repo/github/cenotelie/cratery/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/repo/github/cenotelie/cratery)

This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate cratery

Dependencies

(31 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 log^0.40.4.22up to date
 fern^0.70.7.0up to date
 serde^1.01.0.215up to date
 serde_derive^1.01.0.215up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.133up to date
 base64^0.220.22.1up to date
 byteorder^1.41.5.0up to date
 bytes^1.71.9.0up to date
 chrono^0.4.380.4.38up to date
 cookie^0.180.18.1up to date
 data-encoding^2.12.6.0up to date
 flate2^1.01.0.35up to date
 http-body^11.0.1up to date
 mime^0.30.3.17up to date
 opendal^0.500.50.2up to date
 quick-xml^0.370.37.1up to date
 rand^0.80.8.5up to date
 ring^0.170.17.8up to date
 semver^1.01.0.23up to date
 urlencoding^2.12.1.3up to date
 tar^0.4.410.4.43up to date
 uuid^1.21.11.0up to date
 futures^0.30.3.31up to date
 tokio^1.381.41.1up to date
 tokio-stream^0.1.150.1.16up to date
 tokio-util^0.70.7.12up to date
 lettre^0.110.11.10up to date
 sqlx ⚠️^0.80.8.2maybe insecure
 axum^0.70.7.9up to date
 reqwest^0.120.12.9up to date
 tokio-tungstenite^0.240.24.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

sqlx: Binary Protocol Misinterpretation caused by Truncating or Overflowing Casts

RUSTSEC-2024-0363

The following presentation at this year's DEF CON was brought to our attention on the SQLx Discord:

SQL Injection isn't Dead: Smuggling Queries at the Protocol Level
http://web.archive.org/web/20240812130923/https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Paul%20Gerste%20-%20SQL%20Injection%20Isn't%20Dead%20Smuggling%20Queries%20at%20the%20Protocol%20Level.pdf
(Archive link for posterity.)

Essentially, encoding a value larger than 4GiB can cause the length prefix in the protocol to overflow, causing the server to interpret the rest of the string as binary protocol commands or other data.

It appears SQLx does perform truncating casts in a way that could be problematic, for example: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/6f2905695b9606b5f51b40ce10af63ac9e696bb8/sqlx-postgres/src/arguments.rs#L163

This code has existed essentially since the beginning, so it is reasonable to assume that all published versions <= 0.8.0 are affected.

Mitigation

As always, you should make sure your application is validating untrustworthy user input. Reject any input over 4 GiB, or any input that could encode to a string longer than 4 GiB. Dynamically built queries are also potentially problematic if it pushes the message size over this 4 GiB bound.

Encode::size_hint() can be used for sanity checks, but do not assume that the size returned is accurate. For example, the Json<T> and Text<T> adapters have no reasonable way to predict or estimate the final encoded size, so they just return size_of::<T>() instead.

For web application backends, consider adding some middleware that limits the size of request bodies by default.

Resolution

sqlx 0.8.1 has been released with the fix: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#081---2024-08-23

Postgres users are advised to upgrade ASAP as a possible exploit has been demonstrated: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/issues/3440#issuecomment-2307956901

MySQL and SQLite do not appear to be exploitable, but upgrading is recommended nonetheless.