Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

• time-rs/time#293

Calls std::str::from_utf8_unchecked() without any checks

The function xcb::xproto::GetAtomNameReply::name() calls std::str::from_utf8_unchecked() on the raw bytes that were received from the X11 server without any validity checks. The X11 server only prevents interior null bytes, but otherwise allows any X11 client to create an atom for arbitrary bytes.

This issue is tracked here: https://github.com/rust-x-bindings/rust-xcb/issues/96

xcb::xproto::GetPropertyReply::value() allows arbitrary return types

The function xcb::xproto::GetPropertyReply::value() returns a slice of type T where T is an unconstrained type parameter. The raw bytes received from the X11 server are interpreted as the requested type.

The users of the xcb crate are advised to only call this function with the intended types. These are u8, u16, and u32.

This issue is tracked here: https://github.com/rust-x-bindings/rust-xcb/issues/95

Out of bounds read in xcb::xproto::change_property()

xcb::xproto::change_property has (among others) the arguments format: u8 and data: &[T]. The intended use is one of the following cases:

• format = 8 and T = u8
• format = 16 and T = u16
• format = 32 and T = u32 However, this constraint is not enforced. For example, it is possible to call the function with format = 32 and T = u8. In this case, a read beyond the end of the data slice is performed and the bytes are sent to the X11 server.

The users of the xcb crate are advised to only call this function with one of the intended argument combinations.

This issue is tracked here: https://github.com/rust-x-bindings/rust-xcb/issues/94

'Safe' wrapper around std::mem::transmute()

The function xcb::base::cast_event() takes a reference to a xcb::base::GenericEvent and returns a reference to an arbitrary type, as requested by the caller (or found via type interference). The function is implemented as a direct call to std::mem::transmute(). Since the return type is not constrained, this allows transmution to an incorrect type or a type that is larger than the X11 event that was passed in.

X11 events are mostly always 32 bytes large and this function works as intended.

Users are advised to only cast to the event structs provided by the xcb crate (and hope for the best).

This issue is tracked here: https://github.com/rust-x-bindings/rust-xcb/issues/78

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.