This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate cloud-dns

Dependencies

(15 total, 7 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 serde^1.0.1301.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.0.681.0.149up to date
 thiserror^1.0.302.0.18out of date
 async-trait^0.1.500.1.89up to date
 url^2.2.22.5.8up to date
 serde_path_to_error^0.1.40.1.20up to date
 tame-oauth^0.7.00.10.0out of date
 http^0.2.51.4.0out of date
 tower^0.4.100.5.3out of date
 tower-http^0.30.6.8out of date
 hyper^0.14.131.8.1out of date
 http-body^0.4.31.0.1out of date
 bytes ⚠️^1.1.01.11.1maybe insecure
 pin-project-lite^0.2.70.2.17up to date
 futures^0.3.170.3.32up to date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 tokio ⚠️^1.12.01.50.0maybe insecure
 hyper-rustls^0.230.27.7out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.