This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
yup-hyper-mock(5 total, 2 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| futures | ^0.3 | 0.3.31 | up to date |
| hyper ⚠️ | ^0.14 | 1.5.0 | out of date |
| log | >=0.4 | 0.4.22 | up to date |
| mio ⚠️ | ^0.8 | 1.0.2 | out of date |
| tokio ⚠️ | ^1.0 | 1.41.0 | maybe insecure |
(2 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| env_logger | ^0.7 | 0.11.5 | out of date |
| tokio ⚠️ | ^1.0 | 1.41.0 | maybe insecure |
hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smugglinghyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers.
Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.
To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents
but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.
hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data lossWhen decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation,
this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.
To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send
requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible,
any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.
tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruptionOn Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.
This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.
The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.
Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:
let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);
mio: Tokens for named pipes may be delivered after deregistrationWhen using named pipes on Windows, mio will under some circumstances return invalid tokens that correspond to named pipes that have already been deregistered from the mio registry. The impact of this vulnerability depends on how mio is used. For some applications, invalid tokens may be ignored or cause a warning or a crash. On the other hand, for applications that store pointers in the tokens, this vulnerability may result in a use-after-free.
For users of Tokio, this vulnerability is serious and can result in a use-after-free in Tokio.
The vulnerability is Windows-specific, and can only happen if you are using named pipes. Other IO resources are not affected.
This vulnerability has been fixed in mio v0.8.11.
All versions of mio between v0.7.2 and v0.8.10 are vulnerable.
Tokio is vulnerable when you are using a vulnerable version of mio AND you are using at least Tokio v1.30.0. Versions of Tokio prior to v1.30.0 will ignore invalid tokens, so they are not vulnerable.
Vulnerable libraries that use mio can work around this issue by detecting and ignoring invalid tokens.
When an IO resource registered with mio has a readiness event, mio delivers that readiness event to the user using a user-specified token. Mio guarantees that when an IO resource is deregistered, then it will never return the token for that IO resource again. However, for named pipes on windows, mio may sometimes deliver the token for a named pipe even though the named pipe has been previously deregistered.
This vulnerability was originally reported in the Tokio issue tracker: tokio-rs/tokio#6369
This vulnerability was fixed in: tokio-rs/mio#1760
Thank you to @rofoun and @radekvit for discovering and reporting this issue.