This is an entry in the RustSec database for the Wasmtime security advisory located at https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/security/advisories/GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8. For more information see the GitHub-hosted security advisory.

This is an entry in the RustSec database for the Wasmtime security advisory located at https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/security/advisories/GHSA-fm79-3f68-h2fc. For more information see the GitHub-hosted security advisory.

Previous versions of tracing-subscriber were vulnerable to ANSI escape sequence injection attacks. Untrusted user input containing ANSI escape sequences could be injected into terminal output when logged, potentially allowing attackers to:

• Manipulate terminal title bars
• Clear screens or modify terminal display
• Potentially mislead users through terminal manipulation

In isolation, impact is minimal, however security issues have been found in terminal emulators that enabled an attacker to use ANSI escape sequences via logs to exploit vulnerabilities in the terminal emulator.

This was patched in PR #3368 to escape ANSI control characters from user input.

This is an entry in the RustSec database for the Wasmtime security advisory located at https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/security/advisories/GHSA-hc7m-r6v8-hg9q For more information see the GitHub-hosted security advisory.

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.