This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate trust-dns-proto

Dependencies

(22 total, 9 outdated, 4 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 byteorder^1.21.5.0up to date
 data-encoding^2.1.02.9.0up to date
 enum-as-inner^0.20.6.1out of date
 failure^0.10.1.8up to date
 futures^0.1.260.3.31out of date
 idna ⚠️^0.1.41.0.3out of date
 lazy_static^1.01.5.0up to date
 log^0.4.10.4.27up to date
 openssl ⚠️^0.100.10.73maybe insecure
 rand^0.60.9.1out of date
 ring ⚠️^0.140.17.14out of date
 serde^1.01.0.219up to date
 smallvec ⚠️^0.61.15.1out of date
 socket2^0.3.40.6.0out of date
 tokio-executor^0.1.70.1.10up to date
 tokio-io^0.10.1.13up to date
 tokio-reactor^0.10.1.12up to date
 tokio-tcp^0.10.1.4up to date
 tokio-timer^0.2.100.2.13up to date
 tokio-udp^0.10.1.6up to date
 untrusted^0.60.9.0out of date
 url^1.6.02.5.4out of date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, 2 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 env_logger^0.60.11.8out of date
 tokio ⚠️^0.1.151.46.1out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many

RUSTSEC-2021-0003

A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.

tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channel

RUSTSEC-2021-0124

If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.

idna: `idna` accepts Punycode labels that do not produce any non-ASCII when decoded

RUSTSEC-2024-0421

idna 0.5.0 and earlier accepts Punycode labels that do not produce any non-ASCII output, which means that either ASCII labels or the empty root label can be masked such that they appear unequal without IDNA processing or when processed with a different implementation and equal when processed with idna 0.5.0 or earlier.

Concretely, example.org and xn--example-.org become equal after processing by idna 0.5.0 or earlier. Also, example.org.xn-- and example.org. become equal after processing by idna 0.5.0 or earlier.

In applications using idna (but not in idna itself) this may be able to lead to privilege escalation when host name comparison is part of a privilege check and the behavior is combined with a client that resolves domains with such labels instead of treating them as errors that preclude DNS resolution / URL fetching and with the attacker managing to introduce a DNS entry (and TLS certificate) for an xn---masked name that turns into the name of the target when processed by idna 0.5.0 or earlier.

Remedy

Upgrade to idna 1.0.3 or later, if depending on idna directly, or to url 2.5.4 or later, if depending on idna via url. (This issue was fixed in idna 1.0.0, but versions earlier than 1.0.3 are not recommended for other reasons.)

When upgrading, please take a moment to read about alternative Unicode back ends for idna.

If you are using Rust earlier than 1.81 in combination with SQLx 0.8.2 or earlier, please also read an issue about combining them with url 2.5.4 and idna 1.0.3.

Additional information

This issue resulted from idna 0.5.0 and earlier implementing the UTS 46 specification literally on this point and the specification having this bug. The specification bug has been fixed in revision 33 of UTS 46.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to kageshiron for recognizing the security implications of this behavior.

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.

openssl: Use-After-Free in `Md::fetch` and `Cipher::fetch`

RUSTSEC-2025-0022

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.