This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate trust-dns-proto


(24 total, 1 outdated, 3 insecure)

 async-trait^0.1.360.1.50up to date
 backtrace^0.3.500.3.57up to date
 cfg-if^11.0.0up to date
 data-encoding^ to date
 enum-as-inner^ to date
 futures-channel^ to date
 futures-io^ to date
 idna^ to date
 ipnet^ to date
 js-sys^0.3.440.3.50up to date
 lazy_static^ to date
 log^ to date
 rand^ to date
 ring^ to date
 serde^ to date
 socket2^ of date
 thiserror^ to date
 tinyvec^ to date
 tokio^ to date
 url^ to date
 wasm-bindgen^0.2.580.2.73up to date

Dev dependencies

(3 total, all up-to-date)

 env_logger^ to date
 futures-executor^ to date
 tokio^ to date

Security Vulnerabilities

openssl: Use after free in CMS Signing


Affected versions of the OpenSSL crate used structures after they'd been freed.

futures-util: MutexGuard::map can cause a data race in safe code


Affected versions of the crate had a Send/Sync implementation for MappedMutexGuard that only considered variance on T, while MappedMutexGuard dereferenced to U.

This could of led to data races in safe Rust code when a closure used in MutexGuard::map() returns U that is unrelated to T.

The issue was fixed by fixing Send and Sync implementations, and by adding a PhantomData<&'a mut U> marker to the MappedMutexGuard type to tell the compiler that the guard is over U too.

smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many


A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.