This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate trust-dns-proto

Dependencies

(23 total, 3 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-trait^0.1.360.1.42up to date
 backtrace^0.3.500.3.56up to date
 cfg-if^11.0.0up to date
 data-encoding^2.2.02.3.2up to date
 enum-as-inner^0.30.3.3up to date
 futures-channel^0.3.50.3.13up to date
 futures-io^0.3.50.3.13up to date
 futures-util^0.3.50.3.13insecure
 idna^0.2.00.2.2up to date
 ipnet^2.3.02.3.0up to date
 js-sys^0.3.440.3.47up to date
 lazy_static^1.01.4.0up to date
 log^0.40.4.14up to date
 openssl^0.100.10.32insecure
 rand^0.80.8.3up to date
 ring^0.160.16.20up to date
 serde^1.01.0.123up to date
 smallvec^1.21.6.1insecure
 socket2^0.3.160.3.19up to date
 thiserror^1.0.201.0.24up to date
 tokio^1.01.2.0up to date
 url^2.1.02.2.1up to date
 wasm-bindgen^0.2.580.2.70up to date

Dev dependencies

(3 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 env_logger^0.80.8.3up to date
 futures-executor^0.3.50.3.13up to date
 tokio^1.01.2.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

openssl: Use after free in CMS Signing

RUSTSEC-2018-0010

Affected versions of the OpenSSL crate used structures after they'd been freed.

futures-util: MutexGuard::map can cause a data race in safe code

RUSTSEC-2020-0059

Affected versions of the crate had a Send/Sync implementation for MappedMutexGuard that only considered variance on T, while MappedMutexGuard dereferenced to U.

This could of led to data races in safe Rust code when a closure used in MutexGuard::map() returns U that is unrelated to T.

The issue was fixed by fixing Send and Sync implementations, and by adding a PhantomData<&'a mut U> marker to the MappedMutexGuard type to tell the compiler that the guard is over U too.

smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many

RUSTSEC-2021-0003

A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.