This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate trust-dns-client

Dependencies

(17 total, 6 outdated, 2 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 cfg-if^11.0.5up to date
 data-encoding^2.2.02.11.1up to date
 futures-channel^0.3.50.3.34up to date
 futures-util^0.3.50.3.34up to date
 lazy_static^1.2.01.5.1up to date
 openssl^0.100.10.82up to date
 radix_trie^0.2.00.3.0out of date
 rand^0.80.10.4out of date
 ring ⚠️^0.160.17.14insecure
 rustls ⚠️^0.20.00.23.46insecure
 serde^1.01.0.229up to date
 thiserror^1.0.202.0.21out of date
 time^0.30.3.55up to date
 tokio^1.01.54.1up to date
 tracing^0.1.300.1.44up to date
 trust-dns-proto^0.22.00.23.2out of date
 webpki^0.22.00.22.4up to date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 futures^0.3.50.3.34up to date
 openssl^0.100.10.82up to date
 tokio^1.01.54.1up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.30.3.23up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network input

RUSTSEC-2024-0336

If a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io does not terminate.

Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.

rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io and are not affected.

rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use complete_io and are affected.

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.

rustls: Unauthenticated ServerHello can downgrade later connections to classical key exchange

RUSTSEC-2026-0349

The client recorded the server-selected key exchange group for each server name when processing the ServerHello, before the server was authenticated. This record is used to predict which key share to send in future ClientHellos to that server name.

A network attacker can answer one connection attempt with a ServerHello selecting X25519, and then close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that name carry only an X25519 key share, while supported_groups still lists X25519MLKEM768 first. If the genuine server accepts that share rather than sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake completes with classical-only key exchange and no error. This persists for as long as the entry stays in the client's session store.

The impact is loss of post-quantum confidentiality for affected connections ("harvest now, decrypt later"). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass.

The following are not affected:

  • connections to servers which send a HelloRetryRequest for their preferred group,
  • clients with resumption disabled (as nothing is stored), and
  • other server names.

This behaviour is discussed in draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction, so the practical impact depends largely on server policy.