This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tonic

Dependencies

(24 total, 15 outdated, 2 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-stream^0.20.3.6out of date
 async-trait^0.1.130.1.92up to date
 base64^0.100.23.1out of date
 bytes^0.51.12.1out of date
 futures-core^0.30.3.34up to date
 futures-util^0.30.3.34up to date
 http^0.21.5.0out of date
 http-body^0.31.1.0out of date
 hyper ⚠️^0.131.11.1insecure
 percent-encoding^1.0.12.3.2out of date
 pin-project^0.41.1.13out of date
 prost^0.60.14.4out of date
 prost-derive^0.60.14.4out of date
 rustls-native-certs^0.10.8.4out of date
 tokio ⚠️^0.21.53.1insecure
 tokio-rustls^0.120.26.5out of date
 tokio-util^0.20.7.19out of date
 tower^0.30.5.3out of date
 tower-balance^0.30.3.0up to date
 tower-load^0.30.3.0up to date
 tower-make^0.30.3.0up to date
 tower-service^0.30.3.3up to date
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date
 tracing-futures^0.20.2.5up to date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, 2 outdated, 1 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bencher^0.1.50.1.5up to date
 rand^0.70.10.3out of date
 static_assertions^1.01.1.0up to date
 tokio ⚠️^0.21.53.1insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channel

RUSTSEC-2021-0124

If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.