This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tokio-rustls-acme

Dependencies

(22 total, 7 outdated, 4 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-trait^0.1.530.1.89up to date
 axum-server^0.70.8.0out of date
 base64^0.21.00.22.1out of date
 chrono^0.4.240.4.44up to date
 futures^0.3.210.3.32up to date
 log^0.4.170.4.29up to date
 num-bigint^0.4.40.4.6up to date
 pem^3.03.0.6up to date
 proc-macro2^1.0.781.0.106up to date
 rcgen^0.120.14.7out of date
 reqwest^0.120.13.2out of date
 ring ⚠️^0.17.00.17.14maybe insecure
 rustls ⚠️^0.230.23.37maybe insecure
 serde^1.0.1371.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.0.811.0.149up to date
 thiserror^1.0.312.0.18out of date
 time ⚠️^0.3.360.3.47maybe insecure
 tokio ⚠️^1.20.11.50.0maybe insecure
 tokio-rustls^0.260.26.4up to date
 url^2.2.22.5.8up to date
 webpki-roots^0.261.0.6out of date
 x509-parser^0.160.18.1out of date

Dev dependencies

(8 total, 3 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 axum^0.70.8.8out of date
 clap^44.6.0up to date
 simple_logger^4.15.2.0out of date
 structopt^0.3.260.3.26up to date
 tokio ⚠️^1.19.21.50.0maybe insecure
 tokio-stream^0.1.90.1.18up to date
 tokio-util^0.7.30.7.18up to date
 warp^0.3.70.4.2out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

rustls: rustls network-reachable panic in `Acceptor::accept`

RUSTSEC-2024-0399

A bug introduced in rustls 0.23.13 leads to a panic if the received TLS ClientHello is fragmented. Only servers that use rustls::server::Acceptor::accept() are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's LazyConfigAcceptor API are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's TlsAcceptor API are not affected.

Servers that use rustls-ffi's rustls_acceptor_accept API are affected.

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.

time: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion

RUSTSEC-2026-0009

Impact

When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary, non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.

Patches

A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned rather than exhausting the stack.

Workarounds

Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.