This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tendermint

Dependencies

(22 total, 15 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 byteorder^1.21.5.0up to date
 bytes^0.41.10.1out of date
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.41maybe insecure
 digest^0.80.10.7out of date
 failure^0.10.1.8up to date
 hkdf^0.70.12.4out of date
 hyper ⚠️^0.101.6.0out of date
 prost-amino^0.4.00.6.0out of date
 prost-amino-derive^0.4.00.6.1out of date
 rand_os^0.10.2.2out of date
 ring ⚠️^0.140.17.14out of date
 serde^11.0.219up to date
 serde_json^11.0.140up to date
 sha2^0.80.10.9out of date
 signatory^0.11.20.27.1out of date
 signatory-dalek^0.11N/Aup to date
 subtle^22.6.1up to date
 subtle-encoding^0.30.5.1out of date
 tai64^14.1.0out of date
 uuid^0.71.17.0out of date
 x25519-dalek^0.52.0.1out of date
 zeroize^0.61.8.1out of date

Dev dependencies

(1 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 serde_json^11.0.140up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.