This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tame-index

Dependencies

(20 total, 8 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes ⚠️^1.41.11.1maybe insecure
 camino^1.11.2.2up to date
 crossbeam-channel^0.50.5.15up to date
 gix^0.550.80.0out of date
 home^0.50.5.12up to date
 http^0.21.4.0out of date
 libc^0.20.2.183up to date
 memchr^2.52.8.0up to date
 rayon^1.71.11.0up to date
 reqwest^0.110.13.2out of date
 semver^1.01.0.27up to date
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.149up to date
 sha2^0.100.10.9up to date
 smol_str^0.2.00.3.6out of date
 thiserror^1.02.0.18out of date
 tokio ⚠️^1.01.50.0maybe insecure
 toml^0.81.0.7+spec-1.1.0out of date
 twox-hash^1.62.1.2out of date
 windows-targets^0.48.50.53.5out of date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, 2 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 cargo_metadata^0.180.23.1out of date
 rayon^1.71.11.0up to date
 tempfile^3.63.27.0up to date
 tiny-bench^0.30.4.0out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.