This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate sequoia-openpgp

Dependencies

(55 total, 11 outdated, 1 insecure, 5 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 aes^0.80.8.4up to date
 aes-gcm ⚠️^0.100.10.3maybe insecure
 anyhow^1.0.181.0.102up to date
 base64>=0.21, <0.230.22.1up to date
 block-padding^0.30.4.2out of date
 blowfish^0.90.9.1up to date
 botan>=0.10.6, <0.120.12.0out of date
 buffered-reader^1.3.01.4.0up to date
 bzip2 ⚠️>=0.4, <0.60.6.1out of date
 camellia^0.10.1.0up to date
 cast5^0.110.11.1up to date
 cfb-mode^0.80.8.2up to date
 chrono ⚠️^0.4.100.4.44maybe insecure
 cipher^0.40.5.1out of date
 des^0.80.8.1up to date
 digest^0.100.11.2out of date
 dsa^0.60.6.3up to date
 dyn-clone^11.0.20up to date
 eax^0.50.5.0up to date
 ecb^0.10.1.2up to date
 ecdsa^0.160.16.9up to date
 ed25519^22.2.3up to date
 ed25519-dalek^22.2.0up to date
 flate2^1.0.11.1.9up to date
 getrandom^0.20.4.2out of date
 idea^0.50.5.1up to date
 idna>=1.0.3, <21.1.0up to date
 lalrpop-util^0.200.23.1out of date
 lazy_static^1.4.01.5.0up to date
 libc^0.2.660.2.183up to date
 md-5^0.100.10.6up to date
 memsec>=0.5, <0.80.7.0up to date
 nettle^7.37.4.0up to date
 num-bigint-dig^0.80.9.1out of date
 once_cell^11.21.4up to date
 openssl ⚠️^0.10.550.10.76maybe insecure
 openssl-sys^0.9.900.9.112up to date
 p256^0.130.13.2up to date
 p384^0.130.13.1up to date
 p521^0.130.13.3up to date
 rand^0.80.10.0out of date
 rand_core^0.60.10.0out of date
 regex ⚠️^11.12.3maybe insecure
 regex-syntax^0.80.8.10up to date
 ripemd^0.10.1.3up to date
 rsa ⚠️^0.9.00.9.10insecure
 sha1collisiondetection^0.3.10.3.4up to date
 sha2^0.100.10.9up to date
 thiserror^1.0.22.0.18out of date
 twofish^0.70.7.1up to date
 typenum^1.12.01.19.0up to date
 win-crypto-ng^0.5.10.5.1up to date
 winapi^0.3.80.3.9up to date
 x25519-dalek^22.0.1up to date
 xxhash-rust^0.80.8.15up to date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, 2 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 criterion^0.50.8.2out of date
 quickcheck^11.1.0up to date
 rand^0.80.10.0out of date
 rpassword^7.07.4.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

regex: Regexes with large repetitions on empty sub-expressions take a very long time to parse

RUSTSEC-2022-0013

The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the regex crate did not properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted regexes.

This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability is "high" when the regex crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses of the regex crate are not affected by this vulnerability.

Overview

The regex crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's API.

Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.

Affected versions

All versions of the regex crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this issue. The fix is include starting from regex 1.5.5.

Mitigations

We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately to the latest version of the regex crate.

Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.

Acknowledgements

We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the Rust security policy, and for helping review the fix.

We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.

bzip2: bzip2 Denial of Service (DoS)

RUSTSEC-2023-0004

Working with specific payloads can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) vector.

Both Decompress and Compress implementations can enter into infinite loops given specific payloads entered that trigger it.

The issue is described in great detail in the bzip2 repository issue.

Thanks to bjrjk for finding and providing the patch for the issue and the maintainer responsibly responding to release a fix quickly.

Users who use the crate with untrusted data should update the bzip2 to 0.4.4.

rsa: Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels

RUSTSEC-2023-0071

Impact

Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.

Patches

No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.

Workarounds

The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.

References

This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.

aes-gcm: Plaintext exposed in decrypt_in_place_detached even on tag verification failure

RUSTSEC-2023-0096

Summary

In the AES GCM implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (i.e. the correct plaintext) is exposed even if tag verification fails.

Impact

If a program using the aes-gcm crate's decrypt_in_place* APIs accesses the buffer after decryption failure, it will contain a decryption of an unauthenticated input. Depending on the specific nature of the program this may enable Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs) which can cause a catastrophic breakage of the cipher including full plaintext recovery.

Details

As seen in the implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached for AES GCM, if the tag verification fails, an error is returned. Because the decryption of the ciphertext is done in place, the plaintext contents are now exposed via buffer.

This should ideally not be the case - as noted in page 17 of NIST's publication Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC:

In Step 8, the result of Step 7 is compared with the authentication tag that was received as an input: if they are identical, then the plaintext is returned; otherwise,FAIL is returned.

This is seems correctly addressed in the AES GCM SIV implementation, where the decrypted buffer is encrypted again before the error is returned - this fix is straightforward to implement in AES GCM. To ensure that these types of cases are covered during testing, it would be valuable to add test cases like 23, 24 etc from project wycheproof to ensure that when a bad tag is used, there is an error on decryption and that the plaintext value is not exposed.

PoC

To reproduce this issue, I'm using test case 23 from project wycheproof.

    let key = GenericArray::from_slice(&hex!("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f"));
    let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(&hex!("505152535455565758595a5b"));
    let tag = GenericArray::from_slice(&hex!("d9847dbc326a06e988c77ad3863e6083")); // bad tag
    let mut ct = hex!("eb156d081ed6b6b55f4612f021d87b39");
    let msg = hex!("202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f");
    let aad = hex!("");
    let cipher = Aes128Gcm::new(&key);
    let _plaintext = cipher.decrypt_in_place_detached(&nonce, &aad, &mut ct, &tag);
    assert_eq!(ct, msg);

openssl: Use-After-Free in `Md::fetch` and `Cipher::fetch`

RUSTSEC-2025-0022

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.