Deps.rs

rustls 0.21.10

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/crate/rustls/0.21.10/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/crate/rustls/0.21.10)

This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate rustls

Dependencies

(4 total, 1 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 log^0.4.40.4.29up to date
 ring ⚠️^0.170.17.14maybe insecure
 sct^0.7.00.7.1up to date
 rustls-webpki ⚠️^0.101.70.103.10out of date

Dev dependencies

(6 total, 4 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 base64^0.210.22.1out of date
 bencher^0.1.50.1.5up to date
 env_logger^0.100.11.10out of date
 log^0.4.40.4.29up to date
 rustls-pemfile^1.0.32.2.0out of date
 webpki-roots^0.25.01.0.6out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.

rustls-webpki: CRLs not considered authorative by Distribution Point due to faulty matching logic

RUSTSEC-2026-0049

If a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored.

The impact was that correct provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.

This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)

More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.

This vulnerability is identified by GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4. Thank you to @1seal for the report.