This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate reqwest


(42 total, 12 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

 async-compression^ of date
 base64^ of date
 bytes^ to date
 cookie^ of date
 cookie_store^ of date
 encoding_rs^ to date
 futures-core^ to date
 futures-util^ to date
 h2 ⚠️^ insecure
 http^ to date
 http-body^ to date
 hyper ⚠️^ insecure
 hyper-rustls^ of date
 hyper-tls^ to date
 ipnet^ to date
 js-sys^0.3.450.3.63up to date
 lazy_static^ to date
 log^ to date
 mime^ to date
 mime_guess^ to date
 native-tls^ to date
 percent-encoding^ to date
 pin-project-lite^ to date
 proc-macro-hack^ to date
 rustls^ of date
 rustls-native-certs^ to date
 rustls-pemfile^ of date
 serde^ to date
 serde_json^ to date
 serde_urlencoded^ to date
 tokio ⚠️^ insecure
 tokio-native-tls^ to date
 tokio-rustls^ of date
 tokio-socks^ to date
 tokio-util^ of date
 trust-dns-resolver^ of date
 url^ to date
 wasm-bindgen^0.2.680.2.86up to date
 wasm-bindgen-futures^ to date
 web-sys^ to date
 webpki-roots^ of date
 winreg^ of date

Dev dependencies

(9 total, 1 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

 brotli^ to date
 doc-comment^ to date
 env_logger^ of date
 hyper ⚠️^ insecure
 libflate^ to date
 serde^ to date
 tokio ⚠️^ insecure
 wasm-bindgen^0.2.680.2.86up to date
 wasm-bindgen-test^ to date

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling


hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss


When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption


On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.


Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();

h2: Resource exhaustion vulnerability in h2 may lead to Denial of Service (DoS)


If an attacker is able to flood the network with pairs of HEADERS/RST_STREAM frames, such that the h2 application is not able to accept them faster than the bytes are received, the pending accept queue can grow in memory usage. Being able to do this consistently can result in excessive memory use, and eventually trigger Out Of Memory.

This flaw is corrected in hyperium/h2#668, which restricts remote reset stream count by default.