This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate prometheus


(10 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

 cfg-if^ to date
 fnv^ to date
 lazy_static^ to date
 libc^ to date
 memchr^ to date
 parking_lot^ to date
 protobuf ⚠️^ insecure
 reqwest^ to date
 thiserror^ to date
 procfs^ of date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, 2 possibly insecure)

 criterion^ to date
 getopts^ to date
 hyper ⚠️^ insecure
 tokio ⚠️^ insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

protobuf: Out of Memory in stream::read_raw_bytes_into()


Affected versions of this crate called Vec::reserve() on user-supplied input.

This allows an attacker to cause an Out of Memory condition while calling the vulnerable method on untrusted data.

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling


hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss


When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channel


If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.