This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate may

Dependencies

(14 total, 3 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 cfg-if^11.0.4up to date
 core_affinity^0.80.8.3up to date
 crossbeam^0.80.8.4up to date
 fastrand^2.02.3.0up to date
 generator^0.80.8.8up to date
 libc^0.20.2.183up to date
 log^0.40.4.29up to date
 may_queue ⚠️^0.10.1.23maybe insecure
 nix^0.300.31.2out of date
 num_cpus^11.17.0up to date
 parking_lot^0.120.12.5up to date
 smallvec ⚠️^11.15.1maybe insecure
 socket2^0.50.6.3out of date
 windows-sys^0.590.61.2out of date

Dev dependencies

(8 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes ⚠️^1.01.11.1maybe insecure
 docopt^1.01.1.1up to date
 httparse^1.11.10.1up to date
 native-tls^0.20.2.18up to date
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_derive^1.01.0.228up to date
 tempfile^33.27.0up to date
 tungstenite^0.260.28.0out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

may_queue: may_queue's Queue lacks Send/Sync bound for its Send/Sync trait.

RUSTSEC-2020-0111

Affected versions of may_queue implements Send/Sync for its Queue type without restricting it to Sendable types and Syncable types.

This allows non-Sync types such as Cell to be shared across threads leading to undefined behavior and memory corruption in concurrent programs.

smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many

RUSTSEC-2021-0003

A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.