This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate hickory-client

Dependencies

(13 total, 1 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 cfg-if^11.0.1up to date
 data-encoding^2.2.02.9.0up to date
 futures-channel^0.3.50.3.31up to date
 futures-util^0.3.50.3.31up to date
 hickory-proto ⚠️^0.25.0-alpha.40.25.2maybe insecure
 once_cell^1.20.01.21.3up to date
 radix_trie^0.2.00.2.1up to date
 rand^0.80.9.1out of date
 rustls ⚠️^0.23.140.23.29maybe insecure
 serde^1.01.0.219up to date
 thiserror^22.0.12up to date
 tokio ⚠️^1.211.46.1maybe insecure
 tracing^0.1.300.1.41up to date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 futures^0.3.50.3.31up to date
 tokio ⚠️^1.211.46.1maybe insecure
 tracing-subscriber^0.30.3.19up to date
 webpki-roots^0.261.0.1out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

rustls: rustls network-reachable panic in `Acceptor::accept`

RUSTSEC-2024-0399

A bug introduced in rustls 0.23.13 leads to a panic if the received TLS ClientHello is fragmented. Only servers that use rustls::server::Acceptor::accept() are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's LazyConfigAcceptor API are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's TlsAcceptor API are not affected.

Servers that use rustls-ffi's rustls_acceptor_accept API are affected.

hickory-proto: Hickory DNS failure to verify self-signed RRSIG for DNSKEYs

RUSTSEC-2025-0006

Summary

The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone.

Details

verify_dnskey_rrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verify_rrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verify_default_rrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in verify_default_rrset(), verify_rrset_with_dnskey() is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its Proof is returned.

Similarly, verify_dnskey_rrset() returns Ok(false) if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to verify_rrset(), it will call verify_default_rrset(). The special handling for DNSKEYs in verify_default_rrset() will then call verify_rrset_with_dnskey() using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its Proof. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside verify_dnskey_rrset() and cut verify_default_rrset() out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely.