This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate factom

Dependencies

(12 total, 5 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes^0.5.21.6.1out of date
 futures^0.3.10.3.30up to date
 futures-util^0.3.10.3.30up to date
 http^0.21.1.0out of date
 hyper ⚠️^0.13.01.4.1out of date
 hyper-tls^0.4.00.6.0out of date
 serde^1.0.1031.0.204up to date
 serde_derive^1.0.1031.0.204up to date
 serde_json^1.0.441.0.120up to date
 tokio ⚠️^0.2.41.38.1out of date
 tokio-executor=0.2.0-alpha.60.1.10up to date
 url^2.1.02.5.2up to date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, 2 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 criterion^0.30.5.1out of date
 rand^0.7.20.8.5out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channel

RUSTSEC-2021-0124

If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.