This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate bloom-server

Dependencies

(18 total, 7 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 brotli^3.13.5.0up to date
 clap^2.264.5.4out of date
 farmhash^1.11.1.5up to date
 futures^0.10.3.30out of date
 futures-cpupool^0.10.1.8up to date
 httparse^1.21.8.0up to date
 hyper ⚠️^0.111.2.0out of date
 lazy_static^1.01.4.0up to date
 log^0.40.4.21up to date
 r2d2^0.80.8.10up to date
 r2d2_redis^0.100.14.0out of date
 rand^0.70.8.5out of date
 redis^0.110.25.2out of date
 serde^1.01.0.197up to date
 serde_derive^1.01.0.197up to date
 tokio-core^0.10.1.18up to date
 toml^0.50.8.12out of date
 unicase^2.12.7.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: Flaw in hyper allows request smuggling by sending a body in GET requests

RUSTSEC-2020-0008

Vulnerable versions of hyper allow GET requests to have bodies, even if there is no Transfer-Encoding or Content-Length header. As per the HTTP 1.1 specification, such requests do not have bodies, so the body will be interpreted as a separate HTTP request.

This allows an attacker who can control the body and method of an HTTP request made by hyper to inject a request with headers that would not otherwise be allowed, as demonstrated by sending a malformed HTTP request from a Substrate runtime. This allows bypassing CORS restrictions. In combination with other vulnerabilities, such as an exploitable web server listening on loopback, it may allow remote code execution.

The flaw was corrected in hyper version 0.12.34.

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.