This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate azul-layout

Dependencies

(58 total, 15 outdated, 1 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 accesskit^0.240.25.2out of date
 agg-rust-azul^1.1.41.1.5up to date
 allsorts-azul^0.17.10.17.3up to date
 azul-core^0.0.200.0.20up to date
 azul-css^0.0.200.0.20up to date
 base64^0.22.10.23.1out of date
 brotli-decompressor^56.3.2out of date
 chrono^0.40.4.45up to date
 core-foundation^0.90.10.1out of date
 core-graphics^0.230.25.0out of date
 core-text^20.122.0.0out of date
 dirs^6.07.0.0out of date
 fluent^0.170.17.0up to date
 fluent-syntax^0.120.12.0up to date
 gl-context-loader^0.1.80.1.10up to date
 hyphenation^0.8.40.8.4up to date
 icu^2.12.4.0up to date
 icu_provider_blob^2.12.4.0up to date
 image^0.250.25.10up to date
 intl-memoizer^0.50.5.3up to date
 libc^0.20.2.191up to date
 libmimalloc-sys^0.10.1.49up to date
 lru^0.18.20.19.1out of date
 lyon^1.0.11.0.19up to date
 material-icons^0.30.3.0up to date
 micromail^0.2.10.2.1up to date
 minisign-verify^0.20.3.0out of date
 objc2^0.6.00.6.5up to date
 objc2-foundation^0.3.00.3.2up to date
 png^0.180.18.1up to date
 pulldown-cmark^0.90.13.6out of date
 regex-lite^0.1.90.1.9up to date
 roxmltree^0.21.10.21.2up to date
 rust-fontconfig>=5.0.1, <5.15.1.0out of date
 rustls^0.230.23.46up to date
 rustls-rustcrypto-azul^0.1.00.1.1up to date
 serde^1.01.0.229up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.154up to date
 sha2^0.100.11.1out of date
 smallvec^1.131.16.6up to date
 spmc^0.30.3.0up to date
 strfmt^0.20.2.6up to date
 taffy^0.100.15.1out of date
 tfd^0.10.1.2up to date
 thiserror^2.0.172.0.21up to date
 tikv-jemalloc-sys^0.60.7.1+5.3.1-0-g81034ce1f1373e37dc865038e1bc8eeecf559ce8out of date
 tinyvec^1.9.01.13.3up to date
 unic-langid^0.90.9.6up to date
 unicode-bidi^0.3.180.3.18up to date
 unicode-normalization^0.1.240.1.26up to date
 unicode-segmentation^1.12.01.13.3up to date
 ureq^3.33.5.2up to date
 webpki-roots^1.01.0.12up to date
 writeable^0.60.6.4up to date
 xmlparser^0.13.60.13.6up to date
 xmlwriter^0.1.00.1.0up to date
 zip ⚠️^2.19.8.1insecure
 zune-jpeg^0.50.5.15up to date

Dev dependencies

(5 total, 3 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 accesskit^0.240.25.2out of date
 accesskit_consumer^0.380.39.2out of date
 azul-core^0.0.200.0.20up to date
 minisign^0.90.10.0out of date
 serde_json^1.01.0.154up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

zip: Insecure Preservation of SUID/SGID Bits during ZIP Extraction Leading to Potential Privilege Escalation

RUSTSEC-2026-0367

The zip crate preserves privileged Unix permission bits (SUID, SGID, and sticky bits) from ZIP external_attributes during extraction, instead of masking them to safe permission bits. If a privileged process (for example, root in an installer, CI/CD pipeline, or container build) extracts an attacker-controlled ZIP archive using ZipArchive::extract() or the stream extraction API, files can be created as setuid-root or setgid. This behavior allows the creation of SUID/SGID files during extraction, which can lead to local privilege escalation depending on the execution environment.

For further details see: https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/security/advisories/GHSA-vv5m-jxxh-4627

zip: zip: `ZipArchive::extract` creates symbolic links whose attacker-controlled targets are outside the destination directory

RUSTSEC-2026-0368

In zip 9.0.0-pre2, ZipArchive::extract creates a symbolic link from an archive entry after validating only the output entry path. The link target bytes are passed directly to the platform symlink API, so a malicious archive can create an entry inside the destination that resolves to an attacker-chosen path outside it. This behavior was verified on macOS and Linux. On either platform, a subsequent application read or write through that extracted entry accesses the external target with the extracting process's permissions.

For further details see: https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/security/advisories/GHSA-4v9h-p7m9-rh26

zip: ZipStreamReader::extract() and ZipArchive::extract() apply Unix permissions through symlinks without confining the target

RUSTSEC-2026-0369

ZipStreamReader::extract() applies Unix permissions through extracted symlinks without validating the symlink target stays within the destination

For further details see: https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/security/advisories/GHSA-4684-h2q9-2vcp

zip: zip: `ZipArchive::extract` aborts the process on a symlink entry with a large declared size

RUSTSEC-2026-0429

ZipArchive::extract() sizes the symlink-target buffer from the uncompressed size declared in the central directory record, before reading a single byte of entry data:

let mut target = Vec::with_capacity(file.size() as usize);

Both inputs are attacker-controlled. ZipFile::size() returns uncompressed_size verbatim from the central directory, widened to a full u64 by a ZIP64 extended-information extra field, and is never cross-checked against the compressed size, the remaining archive length, or any platform-appropriate bound for a symlink target. ZipFile::is_symlink() is decided entirely by the S_IFLNK bit of the external-attributes field.

Vec::with_capacity() is infallible: when the reservation is refused it calls handle_alloc_error() and aborts the process. This is not a Rust panic. It is not caught by catch_unwind(), is unaffected by panic = "unwind", and is not contained by running the call on a worker thread.

A 112-byte archive is sufficient. One Stored entry flagged S_IFLNK with a ZIP64 field declaring uncompressed_size = 2^62 and a zero-byte payload makes extract() fail with:

memory allocation of 4611686018427387904 bytes failed
Aborted (core dumped)          # exit 134

The declared value only needs to exceed the host's address space, not its RAM: Vec::with_capacity() maps address space without touching pages, so resident memory stays flat and the abort happens on the refused reservation itself. Under a ulimit -v cap or a memory-constrained container the threshold drops far enough that a plain 32-bit uncompressed_size with no ZIP64 field suffices.

Applications that extract archives from untrusted input are affected on Unix and Windows targets with default features and no special configuration: upload handling, mail-attachment processing, package and artefact ingestion, backup restore and container-image layer extraction. No confidentiality or integrity property is affected: there is no memory unsafety, no out-of-bounds access, no disclosure and no data corruption.

The fix landed in zip-rs/zip2#984 and shipped in 9.0.0.

For further details see: https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/security/advisories/GHSA-q7v9-x93c-xqv3

zip: AES entries returned without checking their authentication code when the data ends early or is empty

RUSTSEC-2026-0545

For WinZip AES (AE-1 and AE-2) entries, the 10-byte HMAC authentication code was read and checked only after the reader had consumed exactly the entry's declared compressed size. If the archive ended before that size was reached, the read returned end-of-stream and the truncated plaintext was accepted without the check. The authentication code of an entry with no encrypted data was never checked.

AES-CTR ciphertext can be changed bit by bit without the password, and AE-2 entries carry no CRC-32, so an attacker who can modify an archive can alter the decrypted contents of such an entry without any error being reported.

This affects reading AES-encrypted entries with a password (for example ZipArchive::by_name_decrypt) with the aes-crypto feature.

The fix returns an error when the data ends before the declared size, and checks the authentication code of empty entries.

zip: `ZipStreamReader` extracts entries under local-header names that can differ from the central directory

RUSTSEC-2026-0548

A ZIP archive names each entry twice: in the local file header in front of the entry's data, and in the central directory at the end of the archive. ZipArchive lists and opens entries by their central-directory names. ZipStreamReader::visit and ZipStreamReader::extract, like read_zipfile_from_stream, read the local headers in order and use the local-header names without comparing them with the central directory.

An archive can therefore show one set of file names to code that inspects it with ZipArchive and write files under other names when it is extracted with ZipStreamReader. If an application checks an archive one way and extracts it the other way, an attacker can get files written or overwritten inside the destination directory that the check never saw.

The fix adds an opt-in check. ZipStreamReader::enforce_header_consistency(true) compares each local header with its central-directory entry (name, sizes, CRC-32, compression method, flags and modification time) and fails extraction on a mismatch; ZipReadOptions::enforce_header_consistency(true) and ZipArchive::validate_header_consistency() do the same for ZipArchive. The check is off by default, so upgrading alone does not change what ZipStreamReader::new(...) extracts: applications that extract untrusted archives with ZipStreamReader need to turn it on.